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In this study, Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) is employed to analyze 
television remarks of the Prime Minister of Thailand Abhisit Vejjajiva during the 
political campaign of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), 
also known as the Red Shirt, in Bangkok from March to May 2010. This study 
explores the representation of 1)the UDD campaign and its demonstrators, 2)the 
government's measures in handling the situation and the authorities implementing 
them, and 3)Abhisit himself in the addresses. Also, degree of negativity towards the 
UDD campaign and the demonstrators in the addresses in relation to the escalation of 
the conflict is investigated.
This study shows that lexical and iconological choices used to 'portray' or 
'represent' three subjects above in Abhisit's television addresses are not just based on 
certain values which have traditionally been used by Thai power holders to counter 
political dissent. Furthermore, Western values including democracy and rule of law 
are, to a writer's surprise, used.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Short Presentation of the Topic
The demonstrations of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) 
also known as the Red Shirt in Bangkok from March to May 2010 resulted in one of 
the most violent political clashes in recent times (International Crisis Group 2010:i) as 
94 people died including demonstrators, government officials, and foreign journalists, 
and at least 1404 wounded by the end of the rally (People's Information Center 2012: 
441). The high number of casualties resulted from excessive and unnecessary use of 
lethal weapons by the security forces, and from deliberate attacks by militant armed 
elements with links to the UDD (Human Rights Watch 2011:5). Despite the use of 
repressive measures against the demonstrators, the government of Democrat Party 
leader Abhisit Vejjajiva left this crisis relatively free of stigma in middle- and upper-
class public opinion, and remained in power until August 2011 (Chambers 2010:844). 
A question coming to my mind when choosing the topic for this study was 'How could 
the government in a democratic society be able to hold on to power after having 
committed a massacre on civilians?' To approach this broad question, I decided to 
investigate how this demonstration and the demonstrators were 'represented' or 
'portrayed' by the government with the assumption that these representations play a 
role in the government's justification of what it did.
During the demonstrations, Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva 
communicated directly with the Thai people regarding the current situation through 
television addresses. His remarks were intended to be and were also considered at the 
time to be highly significant. In addition, as the government tightened its control of the 
media, these addresses to a large extent influenced media coverage of the 
demonstrations.
In this study, Abhisit's televised addresses, namely, his weekly TV show 
'Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit and television remarks 'Special 
Announcement from Prime Minister' ranging from February to May 2010 will be 
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2analyzed. Specifically, the questions which I would like to ask and that will guide my 
analysis are: 1. How were the UDD campaign during March and May 2010, and 
government's measures to counter them interpreted in Abhisit's televised addresses? 2. 
How were the demonstrators and the government particularly Abhisit himself 
portrayed in his appearances on TV? 3. As the conflict escalated, did the portrayal of 
the campaign and the demonstrators become more negative?
In the questions above, I use the term UDD campaign instead of UDD 
demonstrations. This is because the demonstrators also carried out other activities than 
demonstrations. The term campaign covers both the demonstrations and these other 
activities.
I am not trying to draw any conclusions concerning the real intentions of 
Abhisit or how his audiences received his messages. I have no access to Abhisit's 
mind. Besides, media text can produce many set of meanings to different audiences as 
they will bring different assumptions and beliefs to the process of making sense of the 
text (Fiske 1987 in McQuail 2010:386; Cameron 2001:139).
The main purpose here is to offer a systematic 'reading' of Abhisit's television 
addresses through a set of approaches and tools guided by Multimodal Critical 
Discourse Analysis (MCDA). In short, I first want to show how lexical and 
iconographical choices were employed in these addresses to give meanings to, and 
represent important events and related actors during the UDD rallies and 
demonstrations in Bangkok between March and May 2010. My argument is quite 
simply that these choices were built upon a concept of Thainess and a few celebrated 
Thai values which, as argued by scholars in Thai studies, are essential to understanding 
social and political phenomena in the country, and have historically been used by the 
Thai state to counter political dissent. Second, I would like to see through an analysis 
of lexical and visual choices whether the representation of demonstrations, 
demonstration leaders, and demonstrators became more negative as the crisis 
escalated. 
In Media and Cultural Studies, the analysts tend to rush to the interpretative 
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3stage of the 'what' at the expense of the 'how' (Machin and Mayr 2012:10). That is to 
say we may be aware of what the speakers are doing but not so much how they are 
doing it. By paying attention not only to what people say but also to how they say it, 
we may gain additional insight into the way people make sense of things (Cameron 
2001:15).
1.2 Background Information about Political Conflict in 
Thailand
On September 19, 2006, the Thai military staged a coup ousting the popular 
government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. A stage for the coup had been set 
by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) - or Yellow Shirt - who demonstrated 
against Thaksin repeatedly as from September 2005. In an attempt to eliminate the 
influence of Thaksin, his party was disbanded and its key members were banned from 
politics for five year. Thaksin was also charged with corruption, and his family assets 
were frozen. A coup-appointed committee wrote a new constitution with provisions 
providing advantages to Thaksin's political opponents (Ockey 2009:317). 
Nevertheless, the attempts to weaken Thaksin's influence in Thai politics failed. 
A national election was held in December 2007 and was won by the new pro-Thaksin 
Phalang Prachachon or People Power Party (PPP). However, two subsequent prime 
ministers from PPP were removed by the Constitutional Court rulings. In October 
2008, the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions 
sentenced Thaksin in his absentia (he had gone into exile) to a two-year jail term on 
charges of conflict of interest.
In May 2008, PAD started new demonstration to topple the PPP government 
whom they saw as Thaksin's nominees. In December 2008, PAD occupied 
Suvarnabhumi International Airport and the military led by Army Commander Major-
General Anupong Paochinda refused to protect the government by removing the 
demonstrators (Chambers 2010:842). The Constitutional Court put an end to the 
political deadlock as it ruled to disband the PPP as well as two other parties in the 
coalition government. After the PPP was dissolved, Anupong invited key politicians to 
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4have a talk with him regarding the political situation, leading to a change in the 
political alignments in Parliament when a faction of the PPP defected. This paved the 
way for the Democrat (Prachathipat) party led by Abhisit Vejjajiva to form a new 
coalition government in December 2008. The Puea Thai (for Thais) party, a new party 
formed to succeed the banned PPP, was forced into opposition although the pro-
Thaksin parties had won all national elections since 2001. It was clear to many Abhisit 
came to power due to support from the military and also to some extent the PAD 
(Poovin 2010:243).
In April 2009, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) 
held a mass rally in Bangkok to call for Abhisit to resign. On April 10, the 
demonstrators broke through the lines of the security forces to storm the venue of an 
ASEAN summit held in the town of Pattaya leading to its postponement. This 
thoroughly embarrassed the government. Abhisit denounced the UDD as a 'true enemy 
of Thailand' (Khom Chad Luek, April 13, 2009). In a period called 'Bloody Songkran' 
in the media, the troops performed operations to disperse the UDD rally in Bangkok 
from April 12 to 14, 2009. Several groups clashed with the military in the streets. Two 
people were killed, some 120 people injured, and several public buses were set on fire 
(International Crisis Group 2010:2). 
Even though there were diverging interpretations of 'Bloody Songkran', the 
government was largely able to control the “meaning” of this event, thanks to 
mainstream media's bias against the UDD (Askew 2010:50). The demonstrators were 
seen by many as rioters whereas their demonstration and subsequent violent actions 
were deliberately staged with the aim to obtain the return of Thaksin and his allies 
(Ibid:53). Negative representations of the UDD at the time made sense to many. A poll 
conducted after the government's crackdown showed that almost 75 percent of people 
across Thailand approved of it (The Nation, April 19, 2009).
However, the UDD bounced quickly back from this event as anti-government 
campaigns intensified in the rural north and north eastern provinces and eventually 
staged a 'Final Rally' in Bangkok from March 14 to May 19, 2010, the event this study 
focuses on.
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Abhisit was born in 1964 the United Kingdom in an upper-class family of Thai-
Chinese origin. He has two degrees from Oxford University. After a brief academic 
career, he entered politics in 1992 at the age of 27 as a Bangkok MP from the 
Democrat Party. His political career was meteoric. In 2005, he became the leader of 
the Democrat Party a position which he has held until now. In December 2009, at age 
44, he became the 27th Prime Minister of Thailand.
A political analyst has observed that Abhisit's rapid rise was due to 'his good 
looks, quick wit, eloquent speech and most of all, his honesty with a clean record' 
(Bangkok Post, February 8, 2010). According to Satit Wongnongtaey, one of Abhisit's 
close collaborators, his strengths are that 'he is determined, honest, easy going, 
idealistic, independent, capable, bright and grasps things quickly' (The Nation, 
February 1, 2010). In addition to his strong support from the Democrat's stronghold in 
southern Thailand, Abhisit mainly draws support from the educated urban middle 
classes. His clean and incorruptible image makes him a poster child of an ideal leader 
based on moral politics which has a strong position the political culture among 
Thailand's middle classes (Thongchai 2008:24-28).
Abhisit was fully aware that his incorruptible image was his strength. From its 
start, his government used respect for the rule of law and equitable justice to claim 
legitimacy (Askew 2010:63). Moreover, Abhisit constructed his image as an ethical 
leader who governs based on the rule of law for the benefit of all, not for those of his 
cronies. He set nine golden rules for his cabinet members, three of which directly 
addressed the issue of honesty and non-corruption (Bangkok Post, February 8, 2010).
However, he has found it difficult to gain support from the working classes and 
rural Thais, the main supporters of Thaksin and the UDD (BBC News 2010). In 
contrast to Thaksin, he could not be able to communicate effectively to these groups 
(Nostitz 2011:3).
 
According to Satit, he was often criticized about 'his elite 
background, of being born and educated abroad, of being too sophisticated, lacking in 
experience and having no record of achievements in professional management' (The 
Nation, February 1, 2010). 
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The UDD was formed as a counter movement to the Yellow Shirt or PAD (Naruemon 
& McCargo 2011; Uchane 2011:122-154). It was formed in February 2006 in response 
to PAD's rallies against Thaksin. After the 2006 coup, the movement grew as pro-
Thaksin groups and anti-coup groups formed an umbrella organization called 
'Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship' (DAAD). After the constitutional 
referendum in 2007, DAAD transformed to the United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD). Red became the colour of the movement in October 2008 
(Uchane 2011:144). After Bloody Songkran, UDD added the phrase daeng-tang-pan-
din (Red in the Land) in its Thai name. 
As a movement, the UDD was normally called nor-por-chor (the abbreviation 
of its name in Thai) or sua-daeng (Red Shirt). Leaders and supporters of the movement 
were called khon-sua-daeng (Red Shirts) or just sua-daeng. In this study, the term the 
UDD will be used to refer to the movement. The term Red Shirts covers both the 
demonstrators and supporters who did not join the demonstrations. Therefore, its 
leaders and demonstrators will be termed as UDD leaders and UDD demonstrators 
respectively. As for how the movement, and its leaders and supporters were described 
by Abhisit, this is a part of the study below.
Based on a study made at Chiang Mai University (Yukti et al. 2010), the 
majority of the Red Shirts are (new) lower-middle class people whose economic well-
being depend heavily on the market economy. Furthermore, there were two factors 
which lay behind the movement: Thaksin's populist policies and decentralization of 
local administration. Thaksin's populist policies gave hope to those who had 
previously seen themselves as disenfranchised and overlooked. Moreover, the 
decentralization of local administration, including local elections that began in the 
1990s accelerated the democratization process at the grass roots. People became aware 
of their political rights and the importance of political participation. Likewise, 
Naruemon and McCargo (2011:999) propose that UDD demonstrators mainly 
comprise of 'loosely organized networks drawn from an emerging class of 'urbanized 
villagers' that straddled both urban and rural society, and who had been mobilized by 
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many groups sharing common interests but with diverse origins and ideologies.
Despite the diverse nature of the movement, the UDD demonstrators were often 
portrayed by the Bangkok media as poor peasants, supporters of Thaksin who had 
been hired by him or his consorts to join the rallies (Naruemon & McCargo 2011:666). 
Even though it was undeniable that Thaksin and his network funded the rallies, it is too 
simplistic to conclude that the UDD demonstrators were hired protesters (Forsyth 
2010:464).
The image of the UDD as demonstrators from rural areas (ban-nok) discredited 
the legitimacy of the group as a democratic movement in the view of urban middle 
classes. A widespread idea among the urban middle classes was that poor and less 
educated voters in the countryside were responsible for the problem of vote-buying, 
believed to be the most serious threat to Thailand's democracy, because the former 
believed that the latter sold their votes for short-term and petty material benefit 
(Thongchai 2008:25).
 Ban-nok has two opposite meanings (Thongchai 2010). On the one hand, it 
connotes 'the state of being innocent, uncontaminated, near natural, a contrast to the 
modern' (Ibid). On the other hand, ban-nok can also mean backwardness, lack of 
education, naivety, and uncivilized rawness. All in all, ban-nok are supposed to be 
different, distant, and separate from the urban (Ibid). Based on this conception, the 
UDD demonstrators rallying in the central business district of Bangkok were out of 
their place. They were others, causing inconvenience to the urban population who just 
wanted to live their normal lives. Furthermore, their political cause or dedication to 
democracy was not genuine as they were too uneducated to understand what real 
democracy is about. Therefore, the demonstrations had to be put to an end in order to 
bring back normalcy.
1.5 Thainess
In analysing socio-political phenomena in Thailand, Thainess (kwam-phen-thai) or 
Thai nationhood cannot be overlooked as both a norm of exclusion and a political 
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Thainess has never been clearly identified, it has been widely assumed that Thainess 
has existed forever, and Thai people have supposedly been aware of their traditional 
virtues (Thongchai 1994:11). 
As the domain of Thainess is ambiguous and flexible, it has been given 
meanings through negative and positive markers that are used to identify external and 
internal enemies (Thongchai 1994:3-5,169). As for negative identification, Thainess 
has been made apparent by identifying what is not-Thai or un-Thai. Thainess has also 
been given meanings through positive identification. Some norms have been selected 
by power holders to give meanings to Thainess or as constitutive parts of Thainess 
(Pavin 2005:13).
Like in other nations the meaning of Thainess is broad, flexible, and malleable. 
Political leaders have adjusted the concepts and significances of Thainess in response 
to their interests and changing political contexts. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted 
among Thai scholars that the monarchical institutions and Buddhism are the most 
important elements of the Thai nationhood (Thongchai 1994:4). Saichol (8) argues that 
the holy trinity of nation, religion and kingship has been the central idea of Thainess. 
Similarly, Pavin (2011:1025) proposes that the icons of Thai nationhood are Buddhism 
and the Monarchy (both the person of the King and the institution). Nation, Buddhism 
and Monarchy integrate with each other ideologically in a way that makes opposition 
to just one of them a rejection of Thainess in general (Tambiah 1976 in Dovey 2001: 
268)  
Nation, Buddhism and Monarchy have been preserved as the central elements 
of Thainess because they have served the interests of the power holders. Therefore, the 
idea of Thainess has been cultivated in the education system and the media, and has 
become a 'system of truth' which greatly influences the ways many Thais think 
(Saichol:2).
The Thai state has linked national security to the holy trinity of Thainess (Pavin 
2011:1025). Protecting the trinity has been presented by political leaders as a part of 
national security. They have proclaimed themselves guardians of the trinity of 
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branded as 'others' or 'enemies' of Thailand.
As mentioned earlier, some Thai norms have been selected by the Thai state as 
constitutive to Thainess. Session 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 discuss values of calm (sa-ngop) and 
unity (samakki). Both are celebrated Thai norms that have been used by Thai state to 
counter political dissent (Askew 2010; Pavin 2010).  
1.5.1 Value of Calm
The Thai state has traditionally employed the value of calm (sa-ngop) or calmness 
(kwam-sa-ngop) and its opposite condition (kwam-mai-sa-ngop or disturbance) to 
counter political dissent and depoliticize the nature of political demonstrations (Askew 
2010:18). They have been able to do so thanks to Thailand's hierarchical social 
structure. In such a structure, a stable social order has been highly valued. A political 
demonstration causes kwam-mai-sa-ngop to the social stability. Therefore, forces can 
be used to restore kwam-sa-ngop in the name of public interest (Likhit 1992 in Dovey 
2001:269). 
In addition to kwam-sa-ngop and kwam-mai-sa-ngop, there are other terms 
which connote value of calm, namely, kwam-sa-ngop-suk (peacefulness) and kwam-
sa-ngop-reab-roi (peace and order or public order). In some contexts, both terms can 
be used interchangeably. Sa-ngop-suk is binomial which is formed by linking the word 
sa-ngop (calm) with suk (happy). The meaning of sa-ngop-suk ties with Buddhism 
suggests that either calmness leads to happiness or both conditions coexist. Sa-ngop-
reab-roi is binomial as well, formed by linking the word sa-ngop (calm) with reab-roi 
(orderly). Kwam-sa-ngop-reab-roi shows the relation between calmness and rule of 
law. It suggests that state of calm is a result of rule of law and/or public order. A group 
of military who staged a coup in 1991 included kwam-sa-ngop-reab-roi in their Thai 
name in order to demonstrate their dedication to protecting national public order.
1.5.2 Value of Unity
Unity (kwam-sa-mak-ki) is one of the most celebrated values in Thai society. The 
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discourse of unity has been used historically to create a society of members obedient to 
rules (Pavin 2010:334-5). Unity is a preferable condition, and those who cause 
disunity can be considered enemies. Like Thainess, the notion of unity in Thai 
consciousness is malleable and manipulative (Ibid). Apart from being translated as 
kwam-sa-mak-ki, unity is sometimes called kwam-pen-an-nung-an-diew-kan 
(oneness), and can be interchangeable with ek-ka-chan (consensus) (Ibid). 
The value of unity and the trinity of Thainess are closely related. Nation, 
Buddhism, and Monarchy unite the Thai people. As mentioned earlier, the trinity of 
Thainess has been bound up with national security. Therefore, national security and 
national unity became transferable concepts connected by the trinity of Thainess. If 
one element of the trinity is threatened, both national security and national unity will 
be in danger. 
The values of calm and unity have acquired a special position in Thai society 
partly because they have been distributed through the media and education system as 
alleged national traits of all Thais. Prince Damrong Rajanubhap, a great historian and 
administrator, anchored the values of unity and calm in three characteristics of the Thai 
race: fealty to the nation's independence, tolerance or absence of spite, and wisdom in 
seeking compromise or reconciliation of interests (Saichol:6). Furthermore, both 
values are present in the Thai national anthem which was adopted in 1939. 
Calmness and unity are interrelated. Both are preferable social conditions in 
Thai society as they contribute to 'normalcy' (kwam-pok-ka-ti). A society having 
calmness and unity is pok-ka-ti (normal). On the contrary, a society whose calmness 
and unity are disturbed will become 'abnormal' (mai-pok-ka-ti), and actions are then 
needed to take society back to normalcy. This is because a state of abnormality 
threatens national unity and security.
Part of the purpose of this study is to find out to what extent these traditional 
ideas of Thainess characterized Abhisit's television addresses during the political crisis 
in Bangkok from March to May 2010. The next chapter deals with methodological and 
theoretical frameworks employed in the study. How the data will be studied and 
analysed will also be explained.
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2 Methodological and Theoretical Framework
This study is guided by Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA). Before 
presenting this method, I shall discuss the concept of 'text' and its application. 
The term 'text' is used here in a broad sense (Fairclough 2003:3). In this usage, 
printed documents, film, television programs and music are all considered to be texts. 
Therefore, Abhisit's television addresses are texts. The language component of the 
addresses is referred to as language text, verbal text or written text. Visual components 
of the addresses will be referred to as images, image texts or live images. 
Session 2.1 briefly discusses important concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA). CDA forms the basis of MCDA which will be discussed in session 2.2. Finally, 
session 2.3 discusses the method used in this study.
2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis
The meaning of “discourse” varies significantly according to academic discipline and 
theoretical preferences (Cameron 2001:10). In social sciences, discourse is widely 
understood as 'a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge' (Fairclough 
1995:18 in Hesmondhalgh 2006:122). Reality is produced and reproduced as people 
talk about things using the discourses they have access to. 
Discourse analysis is often called critical discourse analysis (CDA) as it pays 
attention to the role of power (Smith & Bell 2007 in McQuail 2010:349). The term 
critical means 'denaturalizing the language to reveal the kinds of ideas, absences and 
taken-for-granted assumptions in texts' (Machin & Mayr 2012:5). Van Dijk (2001:104  
in Mayr & Machin 2012:30) defines CDA as the study of 'implicit or indirect meaning 
in texts.' Wodak and Meyer (2001 in McQuail 2010:349-50) term CDA as being 
'fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as manifested in 
language'.
Even though there is no single, homogenous version of CDA, most Critical 
Discourse analysts share the view of language as being 'a means of social construction: 
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language both shapes and is shaped by society' (Mayr & Machin 2012:4). Besides, the 
claim which is central to CDA is that the choices speakers and writers make to talk 
about reality are not random but ideologically patterned (Cameron 2001:124). CDA 
aimed at looking for the ideological significance of the choices speakers and writers 
make, and for significant patterns in the distribution of their choices (Ibid:51). In 
contrast to descriptive goals of linguistics and discourse analysis, CDA points to 'why 
and how linguistic features are produced and what possible ideological goals they 
might serve' (Mayr & Machin 2012:5). 
Ideology refers to 'belief systems held by individual and collective', and has 
been used in CDA to describe the way ideas and values that comprise an ideology 
reflect particular interests of powerful groups (Ibid:25). In this sense, ideology 
'obscures the nature of our unequal societies and prevents us from seeing alternatives 
and limits to what can be seen and what we think we can do' (Ibid). Ideological works 
function most effectively when they are least visible (Fairclough 1989:85 in Deacon et 
al 2007:157). 
The ideological works of texts have naturalized the unequal power relations 
(Fairclough 1989:92 in Deacon et al 2007:158). Simply speaking, representation of 
particular events and persons may appear normal on the surface but are in fact shaped 
to serve particular ends. CDA offers a set of tools to expose these ideological works. It 
enables us to reveal how authors and speakers use language and grammatical features 
to convince people to think about events in particular ways, sometimes even 
manipulate them while concealing their communicative intentions (Mayr & Machin 
2012:1). Moreover, CDA pays attention not only to overt linguistic features of the texts 
but also to what is not being said, but indirectly hinted at or presupposed as obvious in 
the texts (Cameron 2001:128). 
However, we should note that ideology is neither monolithic in content nor 
practice (Deacon et al 2007:158). A dominant ideology is commonly accepted across a 
society but is not universally shared. When social groups struggle over institutional 
power, they generate or call on alternative ideologies to oppose the dominant ones. 
When this takes place, there will be strong attempts to contain, marginalize, suppress 
Reading Abhisit
13
or eliminate those oppositional ideologies (Ibid.)
Discourse analysis is fundamentally language-oriented, and has been largely 
insensitive to certain properties of visual codings and representations (Deacon et al 
2007:313). The data analysed in this study are television addresses with both spoken 
and visual texts. To effectively analyze the data, other methods and analytical 
approaches are needed in combination with CDA.
2.2 Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis
David Machin and Andrea Mayr (2012) propose a method to systematically analyze 
media text both as language and image. They call this ‘Multimodal Critical Discourse 
Analysis’ (MCDA). Drawing mainly on the work of Gunter Kress, Norman 
Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Theo van Leeuwan, this approach 'thinks of all 
communication whether through language, images, or sounds as accomplished through 
a set of semiotic resources, options, and choices' (Machin & Mayr 2012:10,29). Such 
choices suggest sets of ideas, values and sequences of activity that may not be overtly 
specified in text (Kress 1985; Machin & Mayr 2012:77). The tasks of MCDA are to 
expose lexical and visual choices through a careful description guided by a set of tools 
provided, and to denaturalize ideology/power interest buried in texts. 
2.2.1 Lexical Analysis
To perform lexical analysis, analysts look at what kinds of vocabularies are used. 
Different lexical choices can signify different discourses or lexical fields which will 
suggest particular kinds of identities, values and sequences of activity, not necessarily 
present in the text (Machin & Mayr 2012:30). Broadly speaking, lexical analysis can 
be performed by using these strategies (Ibid:32-49):
1 Word Connotations – Analysts look at the vocabularies used in a text and see 
whether there is a predominance of certain vocabularies.
2 Overlexicalisation – Analysts look for places where there is a heavy use of 
particular words and/or their synonyms.
3 Suppression or Lexical Absence – Analysts look for certain terms they expect 
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should be there and see if they are absent.
4 Structural Opposition – Analysts look for places where particular words bring 
with them their opposing concepts, values, or ideas although these are not in 
themselves present in the text. If such opposite concepts are clearly built up around 
participants, analysts can talk of 'ideological squaring' (Van Dijk, 1998).
2.2.2 Iconological Analysis
The basic method in analysing visual choices is 'iconographical or iconological 
analysis' (Machin & Mayr 2012:31). Analysts look at each feature in the images such 
as settings and objects and explore the way they can signify particular discourses 
which are not necessarily overt or clear in the first viewing. In most modern media 
including the data analysed in this study, images don't appear alone or signify their 
meanings on their own but are accompanied by language text. In analysing data of this 
kind, we have to pay attention not only to how text and image create meanings on their 
own but also how the meanings are created from the interplay between them, and such 
interplay can either reinforce a meaning or play against each other (Deacon et al 
2007:193,204).
2.3 Method
Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) will be used to analyse the data by 
concentrating on lexical and visual choices. Abhisit's weekly TV show (from February 
28 to May 16, 2010) and Special Announcements from the Prime Minister (from 
March 28 to May 21, 2010) will be analysed. As one of the aims is to analyse degree 
of negativity towards the UDD demonstrations and demonstrators, the material will be 
grouped into three periods: February 26 to April 9, April 10 to May 12, and May 13 to 
21. 
The first phase begins on February 26 when the Supreme Court's Criminal 
Division for Holders of Political Positions read its ruling on Thaksin's asset seizure 
case and ends on April 9 when the UDD demonstrators took over the base station of 
THAICOM to bring PTV, the UDD television channel, back on air. Political clashes on 
April 10 marked the start of the second phase. Even though some might argue that the 
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second phase started on April 7 after the government declared a State of Emergency 
(Askew 2010), I opt for April 10 as it was the date of the first fatal incident. On May 3, 
Abhisit offered a reconciliation plan and an early election date if the UDD ended the 
demonstrations. Due to division among the UDD leadership, they could not agree 
whether to accept Abhisit's proposal and end their campaign. On May 12, Abhisit 
officially withdrew his offer.
The third phase starts on May 13 when the government started the operation to 
'cordon off' the demonstration site to put pressure on the demonstrators to leave. The 
military eventually launched a crackdown leading the UDD leaders to announce the 
end of their campaign on May 19. The final phase ends on May 21 when Abhisit 
addressed the nation asking all Thais to join the 'rehabilitation' and 'healing' process.
The next chapter describes and discusses the data used in the study. 




3 Abhisit's Television Remarks
Abhisit's weekly TV show 'Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit' and Abhisit's 
special addresses to the nation 'Special Announcement from the Prime Minister' will 
now be described and discussed. Video clips of all these TV programs were retrieved 
from www.youtube.com and transcripts of the addresses have been obtained from the 
Democrat Party and Government House websites. (This may all be found on enclosed 
CD-ROMs.)
The data consist of 9 episodes of Abhisit's weekly TV show (7 hours, 21 
minutes, and 19 seconds ) and 14 pieces of televised announcements (3 hours, 2 
minutes, and 28 seconds) lasting 10 hours, 23 minutes, and 47 seconds altogether. The 
data in the first period consist of 5 episodes of TV show and 6 announcements lasting 
5 hours, 44 minutes, and 1 second in total. The second period consists of 3 episodes of 
TV show and 5 announcements lasting 3 hours, 34 minutes, and 1 second in total. 
Finally, the third period contains 1 episode of TV show and 3 announcements lasting 1 
hour, 5 minutes, and 45 seconds in total.
3.1 Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit
The aim of this section is to present background information and data regarding 
Abhisit's weekly TV show. Abhisit saw the show as an important means of 
communicating with the Thai people. He expressed this opinion in the show on 
January 3, 2010, when he and some key persons behind the production evaluated its 
first year.
3.1.1 Background Information about the Show
'Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit' (chue-man-pratet-tai-kab-na-yok-abhisit) 
was broadcast every Sunday from 9 to 10am on the government television and radio 
network, National Broadcasting Services of Thailand (NBT). Some episodes were live 
and some pre-recorded. The first episode was broadcast on January 18, 2009 while the 




Abhisit was not the first Thai PM to have his own talk show. He followed in the 
footsteps of Thaksin, whose ability to communicate effectively with mass audiences 
contributed strongly to his political success (McCargo 2011:300,304). While he was 
PM, Thaksin had weekly talk shows on radio. Thaksin's talk show proved a success as 
three out of four prime ministers after him, Abhisit included, took up the same habit.
According to Abhisit, “...at the period when we first started the program, the 
nation was in a state of confusion. The government wanted a channel where we could 
communicate with the people. When I gave a daily interview, it took around 10 to 15 
minutes. However, only a few seconds of the interview were broadcast on TV... 
(Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit, January 3, 2010)”1 So “...the government 
think we can report our weekly activities in detail to the people through the show. 
Besides, the show brings an opportunity for the government to communicate with the 
people directly on certain issues needed to be expressed and explained....”(Ibid)2   
Satit Wongnongtaey, minister attached to the Prime Minister's Office and often 
referred to as Abhisit's 'image maker', said “...the prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva 
speaks to the camera to more than 60 millions of Thai people who are monitoring his 
work...”(Ibid)3 With the amount and diversity of  audiences targeted by the show, it 
was a challenging for Abhisit to win the favour of TV viewers. Different audiences 
have different priorities or tastes as to what are the most desirable of a political leader 
(Atkinson 1984:179).
3.1.2 Format and Structure
Every episode of the weekly TV show starts with a short title which is a graphic 
collection of Abhisit's photograph connoting determination and hope - similar to 
Obama's famous 'hope' poster (see Figure 3.1). The title ends with a graphic picture of 
the Government House with the logo of the show (Figure 3.2). The logo is also 




Invented in the era of absolute monarchy by King Rama IV, the Thai national 
flag has been a powerful symbolism of Thai nationhood (Thongchai 1994:166-9). The 
trinity of Thainess is represented through the colours: red (nation), white (Buddhism), 
and blue (King). The order of priority is indicated by the domination of blue over 
white and red (Dovey 2001:268). The blue stripe is at the centre with smaller white 
and red stripes above and underneath. The use of the national flag in Abhisit's show 
will be analysed below.     
Each episode of the show consists of one to three sessions including individual 
talk, interview, and advertisement. The order of the sessions was not fixed. Table one 
presents the structure of each episode of the show. 
No Date 
(mm/dd/yy)
Duration of Sessions (minute: second) Total Duration
(minute: second)1 2 3
1 02/28/10 23:16 41:04 - 64:20
2 03/07/10 24:13 38:26 01:57 64:36
3 03/14/10 23:03 24:26 00:26 47:55
4 03/21/10 09:29 40:16 03:48 53:33
5 04/04/10 13:09 24:36 02:29 40:14
6 04/25/10 14:14 45:26 - 59:40
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Duration of Sessions (minute: second) Total Duration
(minute: second)1 2 3
7 05/02/10 30:04 - 00:40 30:44
8 05/09/10 49:09 - 00:57 50:06
9 05/16/10 23:51 - 06:20 30:11
Total (hour: minute: second) 03:30:28 03:34:14 00:16:37 07:21:19
Table 3.1: Structure of Abhisit's weekly TV show (1 = Individual Talk, 2 = Interview, 3 = Advertisement)
The short description of sessions constituting the show is as follows. 
1. Individual Talk – Abhisit speaks directly to the viewers. The topics 
addressed relate to the current situation and the policies Abhisit would 
like to promote or explain. Every episode analyzed has this session.
2. Interview - Abhisit is interviewed by a guest host. The number of the 
hosts varies ranging from one host to a group of hosts. 
3. Advertisement – This is not commercial but promotes a certain 
government campaign. All in all, 10 pieces of advertisement lasting 16 
minutes and 37 seconds in total were broadcast in Abhisit's weekly TV 
shows during the period of study.
         In summary, 9 episodes of Abhisit's TV show lasted a total of 7 hours, 21 
minutes, and 19 seconds. The interview session takes up the biggest share of the 
recordings at 3 hours, 34 minutes, and 14 seconds. The individual talk comes second at 
3 hours, 30 minutes, and 28 seconds. Together, they last 7 hours 4 minutes and 42 
seconds or around 96.23 percent of the total. Therefore, these two sessions will be the 
focus of this study. 
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3.1.3 Individual Talk and Interview Session
The individual talk session in each episode of the show shares a common 
format, with Abhisit sitting in a studio room speaking to the camera as if he is talking 
to an audience. As for his preparation before each show, Abhisit said that he listed 
topics and thought of what he was going to say. But he did not read from a script. This, 
he says, is because if he read from a script “the audience will be annoyed.” 
(Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit, January 3, 2010)4 Abhisit used a semi-
formal style of talk with a soft tone of voice. Satit comments on Abhisit's language 
style that “the way he spoke showed that we (the government) care about the feeling of 
the audiences.”(Ibid)5 Abhisit spoke fluently, did not often pause or look at notes. 
Abhisit did not move his hands but held them constantly together as in Figure 3.3.
His good looks, quick wit, and eloquent speech gave Abhisit good assets to be 
used for appeal. However, his stiffness in talking to the camera and his composed and 
polite manners might lead some audiences to question his sincerity. Abhisit said “...in 
terms of conveying and communicating emotion to the audiences, I must admit that I 
am not excelling in talking to the camera. It is still very difficult for me to speak to the 
camera...” (Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit, January 3, 2010)6 However, he 
said he believed that audiences pay attention to the content not to gestures. Abhisit 
might be wrong since he spoke on a television show. Television viewers all over the 
world not only listen to the content but also watch how people look, are dressed and 




close-up, small details in a speaker's verbal and non-verbal behaviour are noticeable 
and may easily be exaggerated in the viewer's mind (Atkinson 1984:186-7).
Abhisit almost always dressed conservatively in a suit and tie. Satit commented 
that “...at first we talked to Mr Prime Minister that audiences did not want to see a man 
wearing suit and tie talking formally on Sunday. But Mr Prime Minister told me that 
we had to respect the audiences...(Confidence in Thailand with PM Abhisit, January 3, 
2010)”7 Abhisit said that there are many different views regarding what he should wear 
in the show and that there is no final solution on this yet. He said “...some wonder why 
I wear suit and necktie, why I dress formally on Sunday which is a holiday. Some 
insist that it is inappropriate to wear a T-shirt as I am the head of the government...” 
(Ibid)8
As for the interview session, Abhisit talks to guest host(s) in a studio or outdoor 
location such as in Figure 3.4. In this session, Abhisit was more natural in his gestures, 
and his style of talk is less formal. That maybe because the presence of the host(s) 
made Abhisit feel like he was in a real conversation. Abhisit always kept cool even 
when asked difficult or sensitive questions.
All in all, it seems that Abhisit realized the importance of the show as a tool to 
convey a favourable image of himself and his policy to the Thai people. Due to the 
wide range of audiences the program targeted, this task was difficult. Besides, his 
academic and formal language style and his unnatural gestures, along with his 
sophisticated and serious look may have made it difficult for him to win the sympathy 





3.2 Special Announcement from the Prime Minister
'Special Announcement from the Prime Minister' (ta-lang-karn-pi-set-jak-na-yok-rat-
ta-mon-tri) was broadcast for the first time on March 28, 2010, two weeks after the 
UDD demonstration began. The last announcement was made on May 21, two days 
after the UDD leaders announced the end of their demonstrations. The addresses were 
broadcast on the Television Pool of Thailand (TPT). In other words, these addresses 
were broadcast on all six national television channels at the same time. Therefore, it 
was highly possible that most television viewers watched these announcements at the 
time they were sent. The show time and duration of the addresses varied.
As for the location, Abhisit spoke either from undisclosed locations or from the 
11th Infantry Regiment, the headquarters of an agency set up to handle the UDD 
demonstrations. Abhisit either sat alone or along with other high rank officials in the 
cabinet and the army but he was the only person who spoke. Before the session starts, 
the title picture (either Figure 3.5 or 3.6) was presented. 
Figure 3.5 is a graphic picture of Abhisit and the Government House building 
with the term 'Special Announcement from PM Abhisit' in Thai letters. Abhisit looks 
up and has a determined facial expression which is similar to a picture used in the title 
of his TV show (Figure 3.1). Figure 3.6 is a graphic picture of the Thai national flag, 
the emblem of the PM Office, and the Government House building with the same term 
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as in picture 5. The flag interacts with the emblem and the building to connote 
Abhisit's authority and legitimacy as the prime minister of Thailand. Clearly, both 
pictures inform the viewers that what they are going to hear is important, and they 
must do as the announcement tells.
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4 Analysis of the First Period
This chapter covers a period lasting from February 26 to April 9, 2010. There were two 
major events that concerned the UDD campaigns: the Supreme Court's Criminal 
Division for Holders of Political Positions reading of its ruling on Thaksin's asset 
seizure case on February 26, and the UDD beginning its demonstrations and setting up 
permanent camps in central Bangkok on March 14. 
4.1 Background Information
From the start of 2010, it was speculated that the situation around the period leading to 
the day the Court gave its ruling on Thaksin's case would be chaotic. In January, the 
UDD held a few mass rallies in Bangkok and in some provinces. UDD leaders made 
clear that they would stage a 'final' rally to oust the government (Bangkok Post, 
January 30, 2010). It was also expected that the UDD 'final' rally would be staged to 
coincide with the period the Court pronounced its ruling. Furthermore, Major-General 
Khattiya Sawasdipol (Seh Daeng), a high-profile UDD supporter, warned in the end of 
January that, the judges responsible for the asset case might be assassinated by 
supporters of the UDD (Bangkok Post, January 29, 2010). Besides, he said Major-
General Panlop Pinmanee and himself after a meeting with Thaksin in Dubai had been 
assigned to set up a 'people's army' to provide security for the upcoming UDD rally 
(Bangkok Post, February 5, 2010). However, UDD leaders said Khattiya was 
expressing his own ideas not the movement's.
On February 1, Abhisit's house was attacked by projectiles of human excrement 
and fermented fish. He said in an interview that the attack could be linked to Thaksin's 
assets case (Bangkok Post, February 2, 2010), and later said that political tension 
would intensify as there were many attempts to step up actions ahead of the judgement 
day (The Nation, February 4, 2010). On February 4, Abhisit together with key persons 
in the government and military attended a meeting of the National Security Council. 
The Deputy Prime Minister responsible for national security, Suthep Thaugsuban, said 
he worried that an earlier meeting between Thaksin and his UDD supporters including 
Khattiya might suggest a mushrooming of demonstrations both in Bangkok and 
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elsewhere. He said the authorities were now monitoring the UDD to determine if it 
would escalate its campaign to armed struggle (The Nation, February 6, 2010).
In the second week of February, it was clear that the UDD would not hold a 
mass rally to coincide with Thaksin's judgement day. One of the UDD leaders, Veera 
Musigapong, said they would not fall into the government's trap and provide it with a 
chance to misinform the public that the UDD was planning to cause civil chaos similar 
to that of Bloody Songkran (The Nation, February 16, 2010). On February 26, the 
Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions ruled that 
Thaksin had abused his powers when he was in office to benefit his family business. 
The Court ordered the seizure of 46.37 billion of the 76.6 billion baht in frozen assets 
belonging to his family (Bangkok Post, February 27, 2010).
4.2 Data Discussion
The data analysed in this period are presented chronologically in table 4.1. In 'Name of 
Televised Address' column, Abhisit's television show is termed as 'Weekly TV Show' 
whereas 'Special Announcement from the PM' is termed as 'Special Announcement'.
Reading Abhisit
26
No Date (mm/dd/yy) and Time (hrs.) Name of Televised Address Duration (minute: 
second)
1 02/28/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 64:20
2 03/07/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 64:36
3 03/14/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 47:55
4 03/21/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 53:33
5 03/28/10, 8.00 Special Announcement 19:40
6 04/04/10, 9.00 Special Announcement 15:20
7 04/04/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 40:14
8 04/06/10, 16.20 Special Announcement 09:23
9 04/07/10, 18.05 Special Announcement 06:30
10 04/08/10, 21.15 Special Announcement 15:27
11 04/09/10, 22.10 Special Announcement 07:03
Total duration of period 1 (hour: 
minute: second)
05:44:01 
Table 4.1: Abhisit's television remarks analysed in the first period
On March 28, Abhisit's TV show was cancelled and was replaced by the first-
ever 'Special Announcement from PM'. After their first appearance, the special 
announcements were broadcast five times during April 1 to 9. This suggests that the 
situation escalated quickly leading Abhisit to address the Thai people more frequently.
4.3 Analysis of the Data
In this session, Abhisit's television remarks will be analysed chronologically in order 
to see the potential meanings of Thaksin's asset seizure case and the UDD 
demonstration, and representations of actors involved in both events. Furthermore, 




Weekly TV Show: February 28
In this episode, central elements of Thainess, namely Buddhism and the 
Monarchy were explicitly used to emphasize Abhisit's image as an ideal Thai leader 
who was ethical and loyal to the King. Broadcast live, the individual talk session 
began with 30-second footage of His Majesty the King in his wheel chair as he 
returned from Siriraj Hospital to Chitralada Palace in the evening of February 27 after 
residing in the hospital since September 2009. Figure 4.1 is a screenshot of this 
occasion taken from the show. Surrounded by doctors, nurses, and royal guards, the 
King wearing a pink jacket was together with his favourite pet dog, Khun Tong Daeng. 
After the footage ended, Abhisit said that he believed Thai people would feel happy to 
see the King in good health. 
This short footage, along with the fact that the event occurred a day after 
Thaksin was found guilty of corruption, conveys at least three key messages. The first 
two messages have the same function, portraying Thaksin as negatively as possible. 
First, displaying the King's vulnerable condition could be viewed as a part of attempts 
to strengthen the institution (Pavin 2011:1038). It implied that Thaksin's deeds and the 
King's health condition were related. After Thaksin had been sentenced, however, the 
King was healthy enough to leave the hospital (for a short time as he returned the same 
night). Second, the footage reinforced the image of the righteous King who has 




Therefore, Thai people have always trusted the King rather than politicians who just 
come and go.  
Last but not least, it could be argued that Abhisit was the PM endorsed by the 
Palace. Presenting the footage of the King's improving health and homecoming as a 
part of Abhisit's show could be viewed in the same light as when photographs of 
audiences between the King and the 2006 coup leaders were publicized. A few hours 
after the coup, the King gave a number of audiences to the leaders of the coup. 
Securing the King's endorsement was critical to the success of the coup because it then 
became difficult for any opposition to emerge (Hewison 2008:205).
Buddhism was used to confirm Abhisit's image as a moral leader. He said this 
day was Magha Puja Day. So, he asked Thai people especially those who are 
Buddhists to perform good merits on this day. As he spoke, the footage of Abhisit as he 
kneeled before a Buddhist monk appeared on the screen (Figure 4.2). Being a Buddhist 
himself, Abhisit reinforced his image of a moral leader by showing that he supported 
other religions as well. He said: “I believe that holding on to the teachings of 
Buddhism and other religions will contribute to a peaceful society.”1 The reason why 
he said this might also be because his Democrat Party has its stronghold in Thailand's 
deep south, where in addition to the Democrat Party's Buddhist constituency there are 
many Muslims.
In the next six and a half minutes, Abhisit talks about current situation including 




Bangkok Bank on the late evening of February 27, and links them to Thaksin's case. 
He says the explosions were not beyond the expectation of many including the 
government because in this period “there was an important political event...a law suit 
(ka-dee-kwam). Some groups might use these events to create chaos in the society”2. 
In fact, Thaksin's asset seizure case was a criminal case. The term ka-dee-kwam is a 
neutral term that did not suggest either participants or degree of seriousness. The 
choice of this term shows Abhisit's caution in talking about Thaksin.
Throughout this portion of the session, Abhisit employs value of calm (sa-ngop) 
to show the nation will overcome the current troubles gracefully. He employed the 
term sa-ngop (calm or peaceful) six times. He said the current situation was 
challenging for Thai society but believed that the majority wanted the society to 
become peaceful (sa-ngop). The idea behind his calm is related to a hierarchical social 
order. In this hierarchy, everyone must perform his duty and know his place in order to 
maintain kwam-sa-ngop (calmness). He also said “if everyone does his duty, join 
forces (with each other) to monitor (the situation) and be good citizens, we will get 
through this situation.”3 Finally, he said he was confident “in the majority of Thai 
people, who are calmness-loving (rak-sa-ngop) and peace-loving, want to protect the 
system, and respect the nation's main institutions, judicial process and procedures 
under a democracy with the King as head of state.”4
Regarding the upcoming demonstration, Abhisit maintained the same stance 
which he had held a few times already in previous episodes of his show in January and 
February. That is to say that the government respects people's rights to public assembly 
as long as it is within the boundaries set by the law. At the same time, he said it was 
likely that violent incidents would happen during the demonstration. He said the 
majority of those who would join the rally did not want violence. However, it was 
highly possible that a small group, whose aims were opposite to those of the majority 
of the demonstrators, would incite violence. Therefore, he asked Thai people 
regardless of their political colour not to fall victim to this small group. He stressed 
that the government was bound to maintain public order (kwam-sa-ngop-reab-roi) and 
was willing to work with the demonstrators to ensure that the rally remained lawful.  
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In the second part of the show, Abhisit was interviewed by a panel of 
newspapers journalists one day after the Court gave its ruling on Thaksin. Thaksin's 
case and the upcoming demonstration were the topics the journalists asked most about. 
Abhisit was careful in his lexical choices when he talked about Thaksin and the UDD 
and tried not to mention their names. 
Abhisit relied on the principle of the rule of law as he answered questions about 
Thaksin's case. He stressed that everyone must respect the verdict whether they like it 
or not, and everyone must read the verdict before making any comment. In his view, 
the verdict gave justice to all concerned parties. Abhisit said that he could not see there 
was any political motivation behind the verdict as alleged by many. The judges had 
precisely listed the facts and applied legal provisions leading to the verdict.
Even though Abhisit tried not to mention Thaksin's name, his attitude to him 
was negative when he did. A journalist asked “Mr Prime Minister, Mr Thaksin just sent 
us a text message saying he did not accept the verdict on his asset case as he did not 
receive justice. Some people believe the same. What will the government do?”5 Abhisit 
could not then avoid saying Thaksin's name: “...Thaksin has won many legal cases. In 
some cases, he won against people's doubt. But people still accepted the verdict.”6 
Later, the journalist asked what he thought about Thaksin's remark that he would make 
an appeal to the International Court of Justice. Abhisit replied, with a voice that was 
probably meant to make audiences feel that Thaksin's remarks were just a bluff, that 
“...if he (Thaksin) thinks it's possible, it's his right to do so....”7 Earlier, the government 
spokesman told the media that it was unlikely the ICJ would accept Thaksin's appeal 
as it was not a question under its jurisdiction (TIME.com 2010).
When he answered questions regarding the upcoming UDD mass rally, Abhisit 
did not mention the UDD's name when talking about them. He reiterated his 
standpoint that holding a mass rally was a constitutional right. The government had the 
duty to ensure that the rally was within given rights and maintain kwam-sa-ngop-reab-
roi (public order).
Weekly TV Show: March 7
The first part of the show was the individual talk session with Abhisit speaking live. 
Reading Abhisit
31
The last 5 minutes and 44 seconds were dedicated to the upcoming UDD 
demonstration. In the same way as in the previous episode, Abhisit referred to 
principles of law and the value of calm as he spoke about the upcoming demonstration. 
When he talked, there was a predominance of terms such as sa-ngop (calm or 
peaceful) which was used 4 times, sa-ngop-reab-roi (public order), ra-biab (order), 
and pok-ka-ti (normal) once each. In addition, there was a predominance of terms 
connoting the opposite condition of calmness namely kwam-roon-raeng (violence) 6 
times, dued-ron (disturbance) and voon-vai (chaos) once each. 
He said that holding a mass rally was a constitutional right as long as the rally 
was peaceful, free of weapon and did not cause disturbance to the public at large. 
However, it was clear that particular groups aimed to incite violence during the 
upcoming demonstration for their own benefits. Therefore, it was necessary for the 
government to apply strict measures in searching for weapons and ensure the rallies 
would not impact the traffic flow and the way people in Bangkok and nearby areas 
lived their normal lives. 
Abhisit was consistently careful in his lexical choices as he talked about the 
UDD and individuals related to it. To be more specific, he did not say which group 
was going to convene a rally. The upcoming UDD demonstration was simply referred 
to as karn-chum-num (demonstration). Besides, he tried not to call those who would 
join the demonstrators as Red Shirts (khon-sue-daeng). In fact, he used the term khon-
sue-dang only once as he tried to show his sincerity towards the UDD supporters. He 
asked them to join the government in fighting with the violent groups because it was 
now “not a fight between the government and khon sue dang.”8 He believed that they 
joined the rally because of their ideological causes and did not want violence. 
Therefore, he asked for their cooperation in preventing a group aiming to incite 
violence during the demonstration.
During the intermission between the first and second part of the show, a short 
advertisement was broadcast. The video started with a map floating without any global 
reference in the background but Thais can surely tell that this is the map of Thailand  
(Figure 4.3). The boundary of the map is surrounded by fences. There is a home 
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situated at the centre of the map. Then, many bombs are thrown into the map and 
cause fire. At the same time the voice-overs said “If Thailand is sa-ngop-suk 
(peaceful), our houses are sa-ngop-suk. If Thailand is damaged, our houses are 
damaged.”9 
By the end of the video, a footage of violent incidents during Bloody Songkran 
were presented with a voice over telling the audiences to call 1555 if they heard of any 
plans or intentions to cause damages to the country. Figure 4.4 is a screenshot from 
that portion of the video. At the background, there is a picture of a bus which was set 
on fire during Bloody Songkran. The golden logo is the emblem of the Prime 
Minister's Office and the green and white logo is the emblem of Bangkok Metropolis 
whose mayor came from the Democrat Party. The red lettering at the centre conveyed 
the same message as the voice over. It can be argued that this video emphasized what 
Abhisit just said in the individual talk session, the upcoming demonstration was 
violent-prone as some groups intended to incite violence. In addition, the footage of 
violent incidents during Bloody Songkran reinforced the negative image of UDD 
demonstrators as rioters. The government was now closely monitoring the situation, 




Obviously, this video employed the home metaphor for Thailand. Our home is a 
precious place and, if threatened, must be protected at all cost. This metaphor 
interacted with a Thai map, one that powerfully symbolises Thai nationhood which has 
played an important part in the production of Thainess and the creations of its enemies 
(Thongchai 1994:166-9), to foreground values of calm and unity. The video showed 
Thailand as a home where all Thais lived peacefully. 'Our home' was under violent 
threat. Therefore, all Thais must unite and cooperate with the government to fight with 
this group of people. 
 The video created a state of fear among Thai people that the UDD mass rally 
would turn violent, and gave negative images of the demonstrators before the rally 
began. The video was used a few times during the period of study. Later, it will be 
referred to as the 'home' advertisement.
In the second part of the show, Abhisit was interviewed by four news anchors 
from satellite television channels. In continuation from previous episodes, Abhisit 
again refrained from naming the UDD or Thaksin when talking about them. As for 
questions regarding the upcoming demonstration, he consistently based his answers on 
principle of rule of law and value of calm.
Abhisit continued to portray himself as impartial to political conflict. He was 
asked if the government would invoke the Internal Security Act (ISA) ahead of the 
start of the rally. He said no one should believe that the mass rally represented an 




term pok-ka -ti (normal) which he said four times in his short answer. He said “...I 
consider that as long as the situation is pok-ka ti...pok-ka-ti means that political mass 
rallies are pok-ka-ti. I don't think we can suddenly say just because the rally takes 
place that the situation is not pok-ka-ti...”10 However, the fact he had to say it so many 
times rather indicates that he thought the opposite might be the case. Two days 
afterwards, his government invoked the ISA.
Abhisit portrayed himself as an ethical leader fighting to protect the sanctity of 
the law. By contrast, Thaksin was portrayed as a person destabilizing the judicial 
institutions. Recent violent attacks and the possibility that violent incidents might 
occur during the upcoming UDD mass rally were connected with Thaksin's case. 
Abhisit hinted that Thaksin was behind such incidents as he could benefit from them.
Asked whether the government would negotiate with Thaksin if the 
demonstrations turned violent, Abhisit insisted that violence would never bring the 
government to the negotiation table. Asked if it was possible to talk with Thaksin, 
Abhisit said that “...if (he) wants a negotiation, there must not be violence. (he) back to 
be a Thai who pleads guilty when making mistakes...”11 By implication he said that 
someone who goes into exile in order to avoid a sentence is un-Thai. In Abhisit's view, 
Thaksin should come back to Thailand to serve his sentence in order to prove that he 
was a Thai first.
This was the first time Abhisit talked about and offer he intended to make in 
response to UDD's demand for his resignation. The UDD had announced that the 
objectives of its upcoming rally was to demand Abhisit to resign and call new 
elections. He said if certain conditions, economic recovery, constitutional 
amendments, and the end to political hostilities, were met, he would call for an early 
election. Once again, Abhisit reinforced his image as an ethical leader by emphasizing 
that he did not cling to power for power's sake but just in order to fulfil his obligations 
to the nation. Therefore, he would dissolve the parliament so there could be fresh 
elections if his three conditions were fulfilled.
At the same time, he implied that UDD's demand for his resignation was made 
in the interest of particular individuals, not of concern for the public good or for 
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democracy. This was a way of attacking the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party without 
mentioning its name. He claimed that in the previous year his proposal for 
constitutional amendment, which could then have opened for elections, had been 
rejected (by Puea Thai). He did not mention that his Democrat Party had also been 
accused of delaying the constitutional amendment for tactical reasons (Askew 
2010:60-63). 
 Abhisit also used a claim made by the UDD that a new military coup was 
possible to attack Thaksin and the UDD. He said the government would not benefit 
from a coup. Those who want a coup are “a group claiming that they are fighting for 
democracy.”12 They hope that the coup will turn over a board (lom-kra-darn) so their 
past problems will then be solved. Past here refers to the Coup in 2006 which had 
ousted Thaksin and led to the dissolution of Thaksin's party, and the ban against 111 
members of the party's executive committee from politics for five years. In other 
words Thaksin wanted, with the help of the UDD, to create chaos leading to a new 
coup so he could be cleared of his problems with the law. This is the same allegation 
that the government made against him during Bloody Songkran.
At the end of the show, a 60-second video of the song Rak Kan Wai Toed (love 
each other) was aired. It called for unity. Only one verse from the song was used in the 
video: “...love each other as we were born in the land of Thais. No matter which part 
of the country we were born, we are all Thais. Everyone who was born under the Thai 
flag, regardless of tradition and race, is Thai...”13 The value of unity was also 
emphasized through interaction between the song and colourful images as the video 
showed a footage of Thai people, including Abhisit and his ministers (Figure  4.5), 
waving the national flag, and the royal flag around the country. The footage was taken 
from activities under government's campaign Thai Samakki Thai Khemkhaeng (United 
Thailand, Strong Thailand). Then, the video showed footage of violence during April 




A Thai national flag and the royal flag interacted with the song to portray 
Abhisit as a leader protecting national unity. On the contrary, the UDD appeared as un-
Thai since it created riots disturbing the rest of the Thai people seeking unity under 
Thai flag and the monarchy. The footage of violence during Bloody Songkran 
reminded television viewers of the negative image of the UDD demonstrators in April 
2009. The purpose must have been to warn the viewers against the possibility that the 
upcoming demonstration might become violent as well.
Together with the advertisement aired during the intermission and Abhisit's oral 
remarks the video aimed to create a state of public fear and hostilities towards the 
UDD rally. The public should be concerned with the threat of violence from the side of 
the demonstrators rather than fear of the measures the government might adopt in 
order to control the situation.
Weekly TV Show: March 14
On March 9, the government approved the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 
Bangkok and seven neighbouring provinces from March 11 to 23, and the 
establishment of a Centre for the Administration of Peace and Order (CAPO). On 
March 12, UDD began its 'Million Man March' to Bangkok as its supporters gathered 
at five mobilization points around the country while UDD supporters in Bangkok 
prepared for a mass rally to take place on March 14 at noon (The Nation, March 13, 
2010).
The show began with the individual talk session. Abhisit spoke live from the 
headquarters of CAPO in the building of the 11th Infantry Regiment, which now also 
served as his temporary residence. Abhisit's image as a leader loyal to the monarchy 
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was presented through the settings. Abhisit was dressed in a suit with a pink necktie 
(Figure 4.7). The royal astrologers had determined that pink was a good colour for the 
King's health (BBC News 2007). In October 2007, the King had left hospital wearing a 
pink shirt and pink blazer, and since then pink had become popular among Thais. They 
wear pink to wish the King good health.
In the individual talk session, Abhisit talked about the 'million man march' 
activity of the UDD. With a soft voice and calm manner, he talked about good 
coordination between the government and UDD leaders since March 12. At the time of 
the show, neither instances of violence nor any conflict between the demonstrators and 
security personnel had yet occurred. As he spoke, footage of troops inspecting the 
vehicles carrying the UDD into Bangkok was aired (Figure 4.8). This may have been 
intended to show that soldiers at the checkpoints did not harm the demonstrators. Yet 
the footage did reinforce the image that UDD had hired protestors from the ban-nok 
(rural area). At the right side of Figure 4.8, there are two supporters of the UDD sitting 
on top of trucks. This may be dangerous. Only ban-nok would do such a thing. Urban 
TV viewers would get a negative impression of simple-minded ban-nok invading the 




Abhisit continued to imply that the mass rally was prone to become violent. He 
talked about the necessity of setting up security checkpoints to 'search for weapons, 
aliens infiltrated in the protesters, and drugs'14 but not to prevent people from joining 
the rally. In other words, Abhisit implied that the majority of the UDD demonstrators 
were ok but that the rally might be infiltrated by negative and dangerous elements.
In the second part of the show, Abhisit was interviewed by a guest host from 
TV5, a military-owned television channel. The UDD demonstration was the only 
topic. There was a huge difference between the way Abhisit and the host spoke about 
the UDD. Abhisit did not mention the UDD by name whereas the interviewer did. 
 Abhisit made clear that he would not accept a demand made by the UDD that 
he should dissolve parliament within a deadline of three days, and call for a fresh 
election. Abhisit referred to some terms used by UDD leaders on the rally stages to 
play down the UDD's demand, and show his doubts concerning their real goals. He 
said some UDD leaders demanded either his resignation or the dissolution of 
parliament while others demanded both. Some UDD leaders had also said these 
demands were just a first milestone (lak-ki-lo-met-raek). He added that some UDD 
leaders had not just talked about dissolving the parliament but about other institutions 
(sa-ta-ban-uen) as well.  
Even though Abhisit did not specify which institutions he was talking about, it 
was generally assumed that he meant the King's Privy Council which the UDD 




that the institution Abhisit was talking about was the Monarchy itself, in which case 
the UDD leaders would be guilty of lèse-majesté. In Thailand, moreover, the term sa-
ta-ban (institution), is used when one refers to the monarchy. These terms would turn 
up again in later Abhisit shows, and what he really meant became clearer as the 
conflict escalated. 
Just as on March 7, Abhisit employed the term lom-kra-darn (turn over the 
board) as when denying rumours of a forthcoming coup. He said that a coup was not a 
solution to any problem and would benefit no one. His government worked closely 
with the army and no one would like to see a coup. On the contrary, those who needed 
a coup wanted to see more chaos in the society in order to turn over the board. In other 
words, he claimed that Thaksin would benefit most from a coup as he might in its 
aftermath be cleared of legal charges.
Abhisit was also asked about Thaksin's involvement in the mass rallies. In their 
discussion of this matter, neither Abhisit nor the interviewer mentioned Thaksin's 
name. Abhisit implied that Thaksin was among those wanting to incite violence in 
order to serve their personal agenda. He linked the violent faction of the UDD with 
Thaksin. He said “some persons” had gone to Dubai to meet Thaksin earlier. When 
they were back, they said something threatening to the public. It can be concluded that 
the “some persons” Abhisit talked about included Khattiya. As mentioned in session 
4.1, Khattiya had met Thaksin in Dubai at the beginning of February. When he came 
back, he talked about setting up a 'people army'.
At the end of the interview, Abhisit reinforced his image of a moral leader. The 
host asked him if he was worried about his own safety. He answered “...I volunteered 
to do this job. I'm bound by duty. The country is far more important than me...”15 He 
also portrayed himself as an ethical leader who did not want to hold on to power for its 
own sake, but would resign if this could benefit his country.
Weekly TV Show: March 21
The show began with the live interview session. Abhisit was interviewed at 
CAPO headquarters by two news anchors from Channel 7, which also broadcast the 
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interview as part of its news program. This could mean that the government wanted 
Abhisit's message to reach a wider audience. Channel 7 is the most popular TV station 
especially in the rural areas, where Thaksin and the UDD had their strongholds. In this 
interview, Abhisit's negativity towards the UDD leaders and Thaksin was more 
strongly accentuated than before. He employed well-known UDD rhetoric to question 
if UDD leaders were fighting for democracy or for Thaksin.
Earlier that week the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) had met 
with UDD leaders and the government in an attempt to mediate a settlement. Abhisit 
said in a press conference with NHRC that he had no objections to holding talk if the 
UDD respected the laws and kept their rally peaceful. He would send representatives 
to talk with the UDD leaders on 22 March to set a framework for further talks between 
the government and the UDD (The Nation, March 19, 2010). However in an address 
via video-link to the demonstrators, Thaksin rejected NHRC as a mediator since it was 
not an independent body (Bangkok Post, March 19, 2010). Later, UDD leaders claimed 
that they would negotiate only with Abhisit and only after he had dissolved the 
Parliament (Bangkok Post, March 21, 2010).
The interviewer asked Abhisit if immediate dissolution of the Parliament could 
be talked about. This was the first time that Abhisit explicitly addressed the issue of 
Thaksin's influence over the UDD leaders, and spoke negatively of them all. Even 
though he still looked calm, his tone changed noticeably as he answered this question. 
He uttered Thaksin's name five times and referred to the UDD leaders fourteen times 
as nor-por-chor (a Thai acronym of the UDD) in a reply lasting just five minutes and 
48 seconds. He voiced his suspicion that Thaksin was trying to block all negotiations 
in order to prevent the UDD from ending its rally gracefully. The fact that the UDD 
leaders insisted that they would talk only to Abhisit and only after he had dissolved the 
Parliament raised a question about who in the  movement had the authority to decide if 
the negotiation should be cut off or proceed. Besides, Abhisit said that if the nor-por-
chor would not turn up for talks on March 22, then it could only be concluded that the 




It is interesting that Abhisit used the term nor-por-chor instead of sue-daeng 
(Red Shirts) to call the UDD leaders. It may be because sue-dang is a broader term 
including all of the demonstrators. In other words, he tried not to be too negative 
towards the common demonstrators but single out the leaders closest to Thaksin.
The interviewer mentioned the UDD's controversial 'blood curse campaign' 
with blood being collected from the demonstrators, in order to be poured out at the 
entrances to Government House, the Democrat Party headquarters, and Abhisit's 
residence (Bangkok Post, March 17, 2010). The image of the ethical Abhisit facing 
unruly UDD demonstrators was reinforced. Abhisit was asked how he felt about the 
blood incident. He said with a soft voice and calm manners that the campaign might be 
considered an offence as his house was a private property. Many of his supporters had 
told him not to let the demonstrators pour blood at his house. He said he had to admit 
that as a human being he was angry. However, as prime minister, he must avoid getting 
influenced by personal feelings whenever he made decisions for the benefit of the 
public. Therefore, he had decided not to dispatch any security officers to block the 
demonstrators from marching to his house. This could, he said, have led to clashes.
As he answered, footage of demonstrators shouting and pouring blood in front 
of his house was presented on the right side of the screen (Figure 4.9). As a stark 
contrast to the quiet emotion of Abhisit, one sees the rude action of the UDD 
demonstrators. This may have been calculated to make audiences more sympathetic to 




spectacular that everyone could relate to it. A private home is a precious place. The 
viewers would think what if a similar incident happened to them, they would feel bad 
and angry. Thus the negative image of the UDD demonstrators as rioters and ban-nok 
was further reinforced. This symbolic campaign was even criticized by some UDD 
supporters. For instance, Major-General Khattiya saw the campaign as 'silly move' 
(Bangkok Post, March 17, 2010). He had more faith in outright violence.
As in previous episodes, Abhisit used some of UDD's famous rhetoric to  
question if parliament dissolution was the UDD's true and final demand. He said the 
UDD leaders talked in the rally about 'class war' (song-kram-chon-chan), 
overthrowing the 'elites' (amataya), and establishment of a 'new Thai state' (rud-tai-
mai). Not only they incited hatred in Thai society, he wondered if these three things 
related to the movement's demand for House dissolution. In other words, Abhisit tried 
to imply that the UDD leaders had a hidden agenda which was 'beyond' the demand 
they made in public. Rud-tai-mai connotes one of the most serious allegations made 
against the UDD. Even though the term may have many meanings, it was likely that 
most audiences would interpret it as an ambition to overthrow the monarchy, and turn 
Thailand into a republic. 
Abhisit used the UDD's claim to be fighting for democracy to attack Thaksin. 
This time he used Thaksin's name: “...If Thaksin is truly democratic, why is Thaksin 
only in Dubai and Montenegro?”16   This gave two messages to the audience. First, 
Thaksin did not respect the rule of law a foundation of a democratic society because 
Thaksin had fled in 2008 to escape his two-year prison sentence. Second, Thaksin 
deceived the demonstrators by asking them to fight in the streets while he spoke to 
them via video link from his safety abroad. 
Abhisit was asked what he would say if he met Thaksin in order to improve the 
situation. He replied in his soft voice, as if he was trying to persuade Thaksin face to 
face that (a word in parenthesis suggests the word was omitted) “...I don't have 
anything personal with Thaksin. I want to tell (him) that first please think about the 
public interest, about Thailand moving forward. Second, I want (him) to accept the 
rule of law and the court ruling as other Thai citizens do. (He) cannot have any 
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privileged right to reject the judicial process. And third, if he accepts these two points, 
I'm sure there will be a way to forgive (him) as Thai society is merciful. Then, 
Thailand could be able to move forward. That is my belief...”17 By saying this, Abhisit 
emphasized his view that Thaksin was the main obstacle for Thailand's quest to get 
back to normalcy.
After the interview ended, two videos were shown. First, the 'home' 
advertisement was aired again. Second, a new version of the video with the song 'Love 
Each Other', this time lasting two minutes and 51 seconds was aired. Again, footage of 
Thai people waving the national and royal flags from Thai Samakki project was used.
After the videos, Abhisit spoke live in a short individual talk session. He 
thanked the officials (chao-na-tee) for their dedication and patience, and the people of 
Bangkok for their cooperation and understanding, and the demonstrators for their 
peaceful intent. It was interesting that Abhisit used rather civilian term officials when 
he referred to the police and soldiers. Chao-na-tee is a broad term referring to all kinds 
of government employees. This might be because Abhisit did not want to remind the 
viewers that his government had been set up with the tacit support of the military, and 
that the army would be needed for dispersing the rally. During the demonstrations, he 
preferred to use chao-na-tee over more military or dangerous-sounding terms when 
referring to the soldiers. Later in this study, the term 'official' (เจ้าหน้าท่ี) will be 
italicized if Abhisit uses it to mean soldier.
Abhisit said that this week the government would try to talk with the 
demonstrators about the need to respect the constitutional limits regarding peaceful 
demonstrations. If this did not work, the government would enforce the law (bung-
kab-chai-kod-mai). However, measures would be taken carefully. Bung-kab-chai-kod-
mai is a vague term. The term foregrounds the fact that measures would be taken to 
uphold the law, but does not specify what measures the government would take. The 
term led the viewers to be warned of future measure to enforce the law without 
emphasizing how they would be done.
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Special Announcement: March 28
Abhisit spoke live on television at 8 am from an undisclosed location. The 
setting reflects the hastiness of the production and the seriousness of the situation. 
Dressed formally, Abhisit sits in front of the white background as in Figure 4.10. He is 
calm and speaks with the same soft voice. Mainly, this announcement was his response 
to UDD's announcement a day earlier that the demonstrators would rally in front of the  
11th Infantry Regiment on March 28 to press him to come out for talks with them. 
Earlier that week, UDD leaders had refused to talk with government representatives 
about a framework for talks with Abhisit.
The value of calm dominated Abhisit's rhetoric as he described the situation. 
Throughout 19 minutes and 40 seconds, he used terms connoting value of calm 11 
times; namely, kwam-sa-ngop (calmness) once, kwam-sa-ngop-suk (peacefulness) 6 
times,  kwam-sa-ngop-reab-roi (public order) 3 times, and pok-ka-ti (normalcy) once. 
At this moment, the situation was not normal mainly because of violent attacks and 
unlawful demonstrations.  
Furthermore, Abhisit discredited UDD's demand for the dissolution of 
Parliament as a political ploy which would not benefit the public at large. He said it 
was now clear that the opposition party (Puea Thai) participated in the demonstrations 
for House dissolution and this weakened the chance of using parliamentary 
mechanisms to solve the problem. At the same time, he claimed that it was in the 




had different views from that of the demonstrators. Therefore in finding a solution to 
the current situation, the government must listen to all groups, not just one. He stressed 
that the government's decision would be based on the public interest. 
A negative image of the demonstrators as an aggressive mob using violence to 
achieve their goals was reinforced. Abhisit talked about the UDD's plan to rally at the 
11th Infantry Regiment to put pressure on him. He said if the demonstrators marched to 
the Regiment, he would not be there to talk with them. He used negative terms 
connoting the opposite of calmness to refer to this plan as an act of 'threatening (khom-
koo), intimidating (kuk-kam), and pressuring (kod-dan),' and said it would not create a 
climate conducive for talks that could bring back peacefulness (kwam-sa-ngop-suk) to 
society. In other words, what the demonstrators were doing was to destroy 
peacefulness of the society.
At the end of his talk, Abhisit implicitly rejected the demonstrators' demand. In 
doing so, he reinforced his image as an ethical and democratic leader. Abhisit 
underlined that as Prime Minister, he was accountable to all Thai people, the whole 
Thai nation, and to national institutions. He was determined to lead the country 
through this vi-krit (crisis). He would not abandon his people and would continue to 
show responsibility. This was because he had been elected by the people and had never 
come to political positions by any other means. The last sentence was an indirect 
attack against Thaksin, who entered politics in 1994 when accepting a post in the 
cabinet. At the same time, it countered the UDD's claim that he himself was an 
illegitimate prime minister who had come to power without a real majority. He now 
highlighted the fact that he was an elected MP who had come to power in accordance 
with constitutional rules.
Special Announcement: April 4
On April 4 , Abhisit spoke live on television in response to the occupation the day 
before of the Ratchaprasong intersection, a business district in Bangkok. He remained 
calm as he explained that this was illegal and asked the demonstrators to withdraw 
from the area. For the first time in his television remarks, he uttered the term sue-dang 
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(Red Shirt). He used it twice as he referred to the demonstrators in a neutral way.
In this remark, Abhisit was persuasive in his tone as he insisted to the 
demonstrators that the occupation of Ratchaprasong was illegal. He said he believed 
many demonstrators might not realize that this. Therefore, the authorities would 
continue to talk and ensure a correct understanding. By saying this, he implicitly 
reinforced images of the demonstrators as ban-nok who needed guidance before they 
could understand what was right or wrong. 
On March 28 and 29, Abhisit engaged in talks with UDD leaders. The talks 
lasted five hours and were televised live. Then, they ended in a deadlock as both sides 
stuck to their positions. Abhisit put forward the possibility of calling early elections in 
9 months time. However, the UDD leaders insisted that he dissolve the Parliament 
within 15 days. 
Abhisit said the talks showed that he listened to the views of the demonstrators, 
and now his government understood their demands. He employed the value of unity 
when trying to explain why he could not do as the UDD demanded and why his 
proposals were preferable. He said differences in political views remained tense as 
shown in recent polls. To dissolve the Parliament in just 15 days would not put an end 
to conflict in society. Before new elections could be held, the rules and regulations 
involving politics had to be acceptable to all sides and all parties had to be free to 
pursue their activities without any hindrance or threat of violence. Abhisit invited all 
sectors in society to work with the government on these points.
Finally, Abhisit asked the demonstrators to vacate Ratchaprasong and return to 
their main rally site at Phan Fa Bridge. He said if the rally at Ratchaprasong was 
prolonged, it would affect the country's economy and lead to unemployment and 
stagnation. Those who would be affected the most by these problems would be the less 
well-off or the poor. In other words, he warned the demonstrators that they were 




Weekly TV Show: April 4
After the special announcement ended, Abhisit's weekly TV show followed. 
The first part was the individual talk session which went live. Abhisit claimed 
legitimacy by referring to recognition from foreign governments. He talked about his 
recent visits to Brunei and Bahrain. He said the visits showed that foreign countries 
recognized his government's legitimate right to govern till the end of its term. Besides, 
leaders of both countries supported his actions to resolve the situation by using non-
violent means and by calling for cooperation from all groups in society. 
In the interview session, Abhisit was interviewed by a guest host regarding the 
current situation. He used the value of unity to show that the government must not 
only listen to the UDD but also to other parties. Otherwise, the conflict would be 
endless. He believed that cooperation from all sides would end the current conflict. He 
referred to what one of the UDD leaders had said during the televised talks that “...the 
(UDD) leader said if the government has five kids and one kid is crying, the 
government should listen to that kid ... the government should do as that kid wants. 
Since the other four kids are not crying, the government would not have to care about 
(them).”18 He said that if government always pampered only the crying kids, finally all 
five kids would be crying. In other words, Abhisit could not surrender to the crying 
UDD because he was an ethical leader thinking of the whole nation's wellbeing.
Abhisit stressed the necessity to have the political rules accepted by all sides 
before he could call a fresh election. Again, he referred to Puea Thai and UDD's 
rejection of his earlier proposal to amend the constitution. He said if they had accepted 
his proposal, the constitutional amendment would now have been completed. Thus, he 
implied that UDD and Puea Thai did not really want democracy or reconciliation. 
Instead of accepting the accusation that the government was delaying the process of 
constitutional amendment, he put the blame on the UDD and Puea Thai.
Abhisit made clear that issues concerning Thaksin including his legal charges 
would not be included as subjects in the talks to end political conflict. In talking about 
this he again used Thaksin's name. He said Thaksin could voice his opinion but it was 
impossible to include his legal problems in the talks because only issues concerning 
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the public interest could be discussed. Besides, some of the legal charges against 
Thaksin had already been prosecuted. Thaksin must accept the judicial process just 
like everyone else.
Abhisit used what the most extreme UDD leaders had said on the rally stage to 
imply that UDD had other more radical aims than just to see Parliament dissolved. 
Particularly, Abhisit talked about the term lak-ki-lo-met-rak (the first milestone) which 
he had mentioned in the show on March 21. Now he linked this term to mysterious 
violent attacks. He said some groups would not stop at the dissolving Parliament as 
they said this was just lak-ki-lo-met-rak. Violent attacks, occurring in parallel with the 
demonstrations, showed that some groups wanting to create situations to bring karn-
plian-plang (changes) or to lom-kra-darn (turn over the board) because they hoped 
changes could clear away legal problems from the past. Besides, some groups even 
went further to talk about sa-ta-ban-lak-khong-chat (main national institution).
Using the terms the first milestone, changes, turn over the board and main 
national institution, Abhisit made serious accusations against the UDD. As past power 
holders have done, Abhisit employed the Monarchy, one of the central elements of 
Thainess to discredit the opposition. Changes can be interpreted in at least two ways. 
First, changes may relate to a coup. That is to say the demonstrations along with recent 
violent attacks was aimed to provoke another coup. Second, changes could mean 
regime change. For most Thais, regime change means to change Thailand from a 
monarchy to a republic. As for main national institution, if we look back at what he 
said in the show on March 21 when he alluded to some UDD leaders' call for the 
creation of a new Thai state (rud-thai-mai), it is not difficult to gauge that Abhisit 
referred to the monarchy. To say the least, it can be implied that some among the UDD 
must have defamed the monarchy as they spoke on the rally stage. Some viewers may 
have thought that the UDD wanted to dethrone the King just as the Yellow Shirt had 
been asserting. All in all, such terms could lead the UDD demonstrators to be 
brandished as un-Thai. For some Thais, just a hint of disloyalty to the King is enough 
to support any measure used to dispel or repress such wrongdoers.
At the end of the interview, Abhisit recalled the destructive actions of the UDD 
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demonstrators during Bloody Songkran. The host asked Abhisit if the situation in April 
2009 or that of April 2010 was more difficult. He said: “...April has just begun. So, I 
could not answer this. However, I do not want to see violence as last April. I do not 
want to see riots, (buses) burnt down, people being beaten by a mob, the use of 
security forces to control the situation, tension, and gas trucks...”19 This was a list of 
acts undertaken by some demonstrators during Bloody Songkran. The PM now 
reminded his audiences that similar things could happen again.
Special Announcement: April 6
On 5 April, the government submitted a petition to the Civil Court to conduct an 
emergency hearing and issue an order to the demonstrators to vacate Ratchaprasong 
intersection. However, the Court dismissed the case because the ISA and the 
announcements issued by CAPO could be enforced without any hearing. In the 
morning of April 6, the security forces were deployed to Ratchaprasong to prevent the 
UDD from march through eleven routes declared off-limits by government order. 
There were just minor clashes between two sides. 
In the late afternoon, Abhisit spoke live on television about the same day's 
incident. He said UDD leaders had misinformed the demonstrators regarding the 
nature of their rally and the intent of the officials. Once again, he used the term chao-
na-tee (p.43) for the military forces. He referred to the UDD leaders as gan-nam (core 
leaders). First, he said the UDD leaders merely told the demonstrators that the Civil 
Court had dismissed the government's petition and that the rally was therefore lawful. 
And after the incident, they misinformed the demonstrators that the operation in the 
morning had showed that the officials were preparing to use force to harm the people. 
Their television network disseminated these messages which helped enabling the 
protest leaders to mobilize a large number of people to join the demonstration at 
Ratchaprasong.
Abhisit used the value of unity as he asked Thai people to remain patient, and at 
the same time backgrounded the failure of the government to manage the situations 
which might upset his supporters. Furthermore, he employed terms connoting value of 
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calm to show that the current situation was not normal (mai-pok-ka-ti) and that the 
government was trying to bring back normalcy (kwam-pok-ka-ti) and peacefulness 
(kwam-sa-ngop suk). In this statement, sa-ngop-suk was used three times while pok-
ka-ti was used six times. 
Abhisit said he recognized the wish of many people who wanted to see 
righteousness (kwam-took-tong) and enforcement of the law (karn-bang-kab-chai kod-
mai). He said the government was not satisfied with the current situation either. 
However, because of the possibility that facts would be distorted, the government must 
be extremely cautious in taking measures to enforce the law. He called measures to 
handle current situation and persuade the demonstrators to vacate Ratchaprasong as 
karn-bang-kab-chai-kod-mai, an interesting term used three times. This term sounds 
neutral and conveys the impression that the government was not hostile to the 
demonstrators. It also hid the fact that forces and weapons might be used.
Furthermore, his usage of the term kwam-took-tong, four times during the last 
three minutes and 30 seconds, was interesting. On the surface, it could mean that what 
the UDD did was not right as the term can be translated literally as correctness. 
However, the term means righteousness in this context.  Abhisit was implying that the 
UDD demonstration was not only illegal but also immoral. Therefore, it was also a 
threat to kwam sa-ngop (calmness) and kwam-pok-ka-ti (normalcy), highly-valued 
conditions in Thai society.
At the end of his remarks, Abhisit said the government was working on a plan 
to counter attempts at disseminate misinformation about the events. He did not say 
what the government would be doing. However, the public would not have to wait for 
long to see what he had in mind.
Special Announcement: April 7
The drama reached a new level on 7 April when Arisman Pongruangrong a hard-core 
UDD leader, led about 2,000 demonstrators to seal off the Parliament and 80 of them 
smashed their way into the compound, supposedly to meet Abhisit to press him to 
dissolve the Parliament and search for Deputy PM Suthep Thaugsuban (Bangkok Post, 
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April 8, 2010). 
In the evening, Abhisit made another live televised address. At first, the screen 
showed full shots of Abhisit sitting among members of his cabinet and army chiefs 
(Figure 4.11). All of them were formally dressed. It can be assumed that they were in a 
press conference as beams of camera flash lights continued throughout the 
announcement. At the centre against a brown backdrop, was the Thai acronym of 
CAPO in blue letters. Above the officials on Abhisit's left and right, were big pictures 
of the King and the Queen in official costumes. At the top right corner of the screen, 
was a 'live' symbol in Thai. The setting gave a sense of the authority and legitimacy of 
Abhisit and his cabinet showing that they were acting in the name of the Monarchy. 
The presences of cabinet members and army commanders indicated the importance of 
the message Abhisit was going to announce. Then, the screen changed to medium 
shots showing only Abhisit. As he spoke, the screen displayed each minister in 
medium shots from left to right, and then Abhisit again (Figure 4.12). 
                                                                                                                                                                            
'Grim-faced' (The Nation, April 8, 2010), Abhisit declared a 'severe emergency 
situation' in Bangkok, its vicinities and nearby provinces and with a full right for the 
government to use its authority under the emergency decree. He also announced the 
establishment of a Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) to 
replace CAPO, and appointed Deputy PM Suthep as its director.
Abhisit explained why an emergency decree was needed citing the 
demonstrators' incursion into the Parliament as the last straw. In doing so, he was 
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careful not to use any terms referring directly to the UDD. Instead of calling the 
demonstrators sue-daeng (Red Shirts) or nor-por-chor (UDD), Abhisit referred to them 
with a term that did not specify to what group they belonged. He said the 
demonstration by a group of persons (kon-klum-nueng) had escalated to include 
unlawful actions causing serious disruptions in the daily life of the general public 
causing severe economic and social impact as well as affecting the image and 
confidence of the country in the view of the international community. It took only 1 
minute and 45 seconds to say this. Clearly, there was a predominance of terms with 
negative connotations: pit- kod-mai (illegal), kwam-dued-ron (disturbance), kra-top 
kra-toen (affect), phon-kra-top (effect), koen-loey (exceed), kad-kuen (resist), buk-ruk 
(intrude), and khad-khuen (resist order).
Abhisit listed four objectives of the emergency decree, and summarized them as 
“...to bring back normalcy and to restore the sanctity of law in the country...”20 He 
stressed that the government did not intend to use the Decree to suppress or harm 
people, especially innocent ones. All actions would be in accordance with the law and 
international standards.  
At the end of this remark, he appealed to the value of unity as he told the public 
he looked forward to their cooperation in helping the government to resolve the 
situation. He stressed that actions violating the law, harming public peace or causing 
economic and social loss would eventually affect all Thais, the demonstrators 
included. Therefore, he asked people to refrain from joining any unlawful 
demonstrations.
The situation was now called 'sa-ta-na-karn-chuk-chuen-thee-mee-kwam-rai-
rang' (สถานการณ์ฉุกเฉินท่ีมีความร้ายแรง) which can be translated as 'severe emergency 
situation'. Rai-rang (severe) is a negative word. It means a situation is extremely 
dangerous and that drastic measures are needed to resolve it. Likewise with the change 
of the agency's name to CRES, the UDD mass rally had now transformed from an 
event disturbing kwam sa-ngop (calmness) to a severe emergency situation. The 
degree of negativity towards the demonstration had escalated through the choice of 
terms used to name it.
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Special Announcement: April 8
On April 8 at noon, the People's Channel (PTV), which had been broadcasting the rally 
at Ratchaprasong, went off the air. Likewise, the community radio stations transmitting 
voice signals from the rally site were either cut off or jammed and a number of pro-
Red Shirt websites were blocked (The Nation, April 9, 2010). The UDD leaders gave 
an ultimatum to the government to get PTV back on air but this was rejected (The 
Nation, April 9, 2010a).
Abhisit spoke on television at 21.15 hrs. mainly about the blocking of PTV. He 
said that after the emergency decree was declared, the government was expected to sa-
lai-karn-chum-num (disperse the demonstration). Instead, he said the first step the 
government had decided upon was to put an end to distortion of information and 
infliction of hatred among the people, and to take legal action against those UDD 
leaders who incited hatred and violence. It was obvious that he was concerned about 
this rumours of a looming crackdown as he said the term sa-lai-karn-chum-num four 
times and denied that it would happen throughout this announcement.
Abhisit justified the blocking the PTV by claiming it was used to incite hatred 
among people through misinformation. He employed several negative terms to support 
this argument. He said he watched PTV after the emergency had been declared. The 
demonstration leaders said on the rally stage that the government intended to wage 
war (tham-song-kram) on the people, and that the government was preparing to seal 
off (lom-prab) and kill (khen-kar) the demonstrators with dangerous weapons. 
Certainly when the demonstrators and supporters of the demonstration heard this 
distorted information, their hostility (kwam-kliad-chag) towards the government would 
grow. They would join the demonstration as they perceived the government as their 
enemy (sat-troo). At the same time, people who did not support the demonstrations, 
having heard this distorted information and continuous threats from demonstration 
leaders to intensify their protests, would become more hostile (kliad-chang) towards 
the demonstrators and might in turn put pressure on the government to take decisive 




 Abhisit stressed the objective of the government was to “return the area 
(khuen-puen-thi) to the public by persuading (nom-nao) the demonstrators to leave the 
rally site.”21 Khuen-puen-thi conveys a sense that the government operations were for 
public benefit and would not be violent. The term draws attention away from the 
likelihood that force would be used in the operations.
In this remark, there was an intense use of terms relating to the value of calm. In 
fact, he employed kwam-pok-ka-ti-suk (normalcy and happiness) five times, kwam-suk 
(happiness) twice, and kwam-sa-ngop-suk (peacefulness) twice in a remark that lasted 
15 minutes and 27 seconds as he showed that the demonstration affected the 
peacefulness and happiness of the public. The government was now trying to bring 
that normalcy and happiness back.
Special Announcement: April 9
On April 9, the demonstrators marched to the THAICOM earth station to force the 
resumption of transmission of PTV signals, and finally stormed into the station 
compound. Thousands of soldiers deployed to protect the station failed to hold the 
assailants back, and were forced to withdraw (Bangkok Post, April 10, 2010). In the 
evening, the PTV resumed its service. Late in the evening, Abhisit gave a televised 
address in response to the incident. 
This time Abhisit employed a different vocabulary as he sought to draw a 
wedge between the UDD demonstrators on one side and the government along with 
most people on the other side. This strategy is called 'ideological squaring' (Van Dijk, 
1998). He used both overtly and implicitly negative terms as he described the actions 
of the demonstrators, and similarly positive terms for the government side. In short, 
the demonstrators were villains whereas the government and the rest of the people 
were rational and moral human beings.
This was the first time which Abhisit portrayed all demonstrators in such a 
negative way. With a forceful voice, he pronounced a set of overtly negative words 
when referring to the incidents at THAICOM. He said “...once again the 
demonstrators (poo-chum-num), who had been violating the law, showed their 
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impertinence (kwam-herm-germ) and defiance of the law (mai kao-rop kod-mai)...”22 
Herm-germ connotes a ruthless character. Abhisit had always been careful with his 
choice of words. Therefore, calling the demonstrators' action herm germ signalled that 
he now was angry. It was reported that in a meeting with security agencies, Abhisit 
said that people were disappointed with the authorities for their inability to enforce the 
law (The Nation, April 10, 2010). 
This announcement was unique in this period as it revealed Abhisit's feelings. 
He used some strongly emotional words: “I recognized that many Thais may have felt 
disappointed (pid-wang), discouraged (tor-tae) and hurt (jeb-puad) by the incident...”23 
Such feelings, he said, were not due to support for him. Rather, they came out of a 
wish to see righteousness (kwam-took-tong) prevail and the sanctity of law be upheld. 
He showed his authority and determination as he made clear that the 
government would not surrender to the UDD's demands, and would continue its 
attempts to defend the rule of law, and resolve the current situation. He employed the 
modal verb must (tong) as he said ”the only immediate mission the government must 
do right now is to uphold the rule of law. Other questions, political ones included, must 
be solved later.”24 
At the end of his remarks, Abhisit said to the public: “Today, we were 
disappointed (pid-wang) but it is not over. I believe if we adhere to righteousness 
(kwam-took-tong), and try to protect the rule of law and the system, we will eventually 
gain victory (chai-cha-na).”25 This last remark made it likely that measures in dealing 
with the demonstrations would be drastically stepped up, and this was indeed the case 
as April 10 would show. 
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5 Analysis of the Second Period
As mentioned earlier, the conflict entered the second period on April 10, when there 
were deadly clashes between soldiers and demonstrators. After the clashes, Abhisit's 
interpretations changed noticeably. Before analyzing Abhisit's television addresses in 
this period, we will summarize the clashes on April 10.
5.1 What happened on April 10, 2010?
The operations to disperse the demonstration at UDD's main rally sites at Phan Fa 
Bridge and Ratchaprasong Intersection began in the afternoon of April 10. At 2.10 pm, 
around 1,000 soldiers marched to the rally site at Phan Fa Bridge after demonstrators 
had tried to break into the compound of the 1st Army headquarters (Bangkok Post, 
April 11, 2010). As the troops marched on, they faced strong resistance from the 
demonstrators. The troops fired tear-gas and rubber bullets and the demonstrators 
responded by throwing objects into a group of soldiers. At 5 pm, a CRES spokesperson 
appeared on TV to inform the public that the operations to return the areas (kuen-
puen-thi) to the public were being carried out, and measures taken would be 
incremental from light to hard, in accordance with the law (Ibid).
As for the Ratchaprasong rally site, hundreds of riot police in full gear 
mobilized at Ploenchit Intersection nearby (The Nation April 11, 2010). However, the 
police began to withdraw from the area at 5.30 pm after they had failed to break 
through barricades set up by the demonstrators with the use of cars and trucks (Human 
Rights Watch 2011:56).
The operation at Phan Fa rally site continued as troops approached 
demonstration area from several routes. As the soldiers closed in on the rally site, 
confrontation and tension between troops and demonstrators escalated. Around 8 pm, 
the troops were attacked at Kok Wua intersection with grenades. Some unidentified 
well-armed men force them to retreat. These men, some of them in black clothing, 
worked with a high degree of coordination and military skills (Human Rights Watch 
2011:57). The first grenade killed the commanding officer Colonel Romklao 
Thuwatham. Shocked by the loss of their commander and the attacks from the armed 
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men and demonstrators, the soldiers retreated from the area, while sometimes firing 
directly against the demonstrators massed before them (Human Rights Watch 
2011:10).
At 9.15 pm, CRES informed the public through a televised statement that the 
military had stopped its operations and moved away from the demonstrators, and that 
it was calling for a truce (The Nation, April 11, 2010). Twenty-seven people, including 
five soldiers, had been killed and 432 civilians and 356 security forces injured 
(People's Information Center 2012:53,432). On April 14, the UDD abandoned the rally 
site at Phan Fa Bridge and relocated all demonstrators to Ratchaprasong. 
What happened during the clashes in the night of April 10 was not clear because  
no detailed report of this incident was produced (Askew 2010:309). It was found that 
high velocity bullets were fired by both the soldiers and the armed group, while some 
demonstrators used pistols during the clashes (Human Rights Watch 2011:62). 
Noticeably, 236 injured soldiers were from the 2nd Infantry division or the 'Queen's 
Guard' and its deputy chief Colonel Romklao was killed. It was speculated that the 
division had been targeted by the armed men because it had been responsible for the 
crackdown on the UDD demonstrators during Bloody Songkran (Bangkok Post, April 
21, 2010). Later, Colonel Romklao had spoken in Parliament to defend the operation 
and blamed the UDD for the violence during Bloody Songkran (Human Rights Watch 
2011:58).
As will be shown below, the presence of these 'men in black' or 'black shirts' 
was employed by the government to claim there were 'terrorists' among the 
demonstrators, and to accuse the UDD leaders and Thaksin of supporting 'terrorists' 
(International Crisis Group 2010:3). On their side, many demonstrators viewed the 
'men in black' as their defenders and rescuers but did not know who they were. 
According to Human Rights Watch (2011:44-46), the 'men in black' were a secretive 
armed element within the UDD, and with responsibility for attacking soldiers. 




From the period April 10 to May 12, eight television remarks will be analysed, namely 
three episodes of his weekly TV shows (lasting 2 hours, 20 minutes, and 30 seconds in 
total) and five special announcements (lasting 1 hour, 13 minutes, and 31 seconds in 
total). Table 5.1 lists them chronologically. 
No Date(mm/dd/yy) and 
Time (hrs.)
Name of televised address Duration (minute: second)
1 04/10/10, 23.25 Special Announcement 10:24
2 04/12/10, 14.00 Special Announcement 04:20
3 04/16/10, 21.15 Special Announcement 08:12
4 04/19/10, 21.00 Special Announcement 29:18
5 04/25/10, 09.00 Weekly TV Show 59:40
6 05/02/10, 09.00 Weekly TV Show 30:44
7 05/03/10, 21.15 Special Announcement 21:17
8 05/09/10, 9.00 Weekly TV Show 50:06
Total duration of period 2 (hour: minute: second) 03:34:01 
Table 5.1: Abhisit's television remarks analysed in the second period
The special announcement on April 19 was different from the rest in that he was 
interviewed by a host. As for Abhisit's weekly TV show, it was cancelled on April 11 
and 18. The show was back again on April 25 but then turned out to be an 
embarrassment. After 5 minutes and 30 seconds of airtime, the show was disrupted by 
a strong signal. Then, the message 'we apologize for the disruption of the signal' was 
run. It took around 1 minute and 29 seconds to solve the problem. The show was then 
replayed from the beginning. Later, it was reported that the broadcast had been 
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jammed from the outside (Bangkok Post, April 26, 2010). The show lasted no less than 
66 minutes and 49 seconds. 
The show on April 25 consisted of both the individual talk and interview 
sessions, while the shows on May 2 and 9 featured only the individual talk session. At 
the interview session on April 25, Abhisit was interviewed along with army chief 
Major-General Anupong Paochinda. The duration which Abhisit and Anupong spoke 
was 31 minutes and 34 seconds and 13 minutes and 52 seconds respectively. 
5.3 Analysis of Data
Special Announcement: April 10
About two and a half hours after the firing stopped on April 10, Abhisit spoke live on 
national television from CRES headquarters. Figure 5.1 is a screenshot from the 
remark. While properly dressed in suit and tie, his facial expression looked stressed 
and he spoke in a slower pace than usual in an apparent attempt to as control his 
emotions. He started his speech by expressing his condolences for the loss of life in the 
clashes between soldiers and demonstrators. However, he did not refer to the events of 
10 April as clashes. Instead, he used the term the incident (hed-karn), a neutral term 
that does not say anything about who the perpetrators had been. Likewise, Abhisit 
referred to the soldiers as chao-na-tee (officials).
In this remark, the term 'kod-mai' (law) had prominence of place. Abhisit 
referred to it 12 times in presenting the military operation as a necessary act of 




to include unlawful actions and thus went beyond the right to public assembly. The 
government had exercised utmost restraint. However, events over the last two or three 
days especially the occupation of THAICOM station had left the government with no 
other choice than to enforce the law. These events shook public confidence in the 
sanctity of law and in the institution which was responsible for protecting the nation's 
sovereignty and its main institutions. If the government simply stood by, it would have 
reflected the weakness not of the government but of the country as a whole. It was 
alleged afterwards that senior military officers were uncomfortable with the latter 
sentence as they viewed it as an attack on them (Wassana 2010:116).
Abhisit said the government had decided to enforce the law by performing a 
kor-khuen-puen-thi operation aimed to return some of the demonstration areas to the 
public. In doing so, clear instructions had been given that public safety must be 
protected as much as possible, with clear rules of engagement. He stressed that 
officials were allowed to use live rounds only in two cases, namely, to shoot warning 
shots into the sky and to defend themselves if their lives were threatened. What he said 
contradicted earlier announcements by CRES. Earlier that day, a CRES spokesperson 
had confirmed that Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban had ordered a general 
crackdown on the demonstrations, not just to reclaim some of the rally area (The 
Nation, April 11, 2010).
Kor-khuen-puen-thi was mostly translated as 'reclaim or take back the area'. 
Nevertheless, a term kor in kor-khuen-puen-thi connotes a sense of begging. In other 
words, the government begged the demonstrators to leave the demonstration area. The 
government did not 'disperse' or 'dissolve' the demonstration. Furthermore, it connotes 
a sense that the operation would be performed in as harmless a way as possible and 
that loss of life would not be caused by the government side. Unfortunately, how 
Abhisit described the operation was different from the reality. Autopsy reports would 
show that most of the wounds on those who died were caused by high-velocity bullets. 
Only in one case was a death caused by a bullet from a normal gun (The Nation, April 
27 ,2010). Furthermore, there was footage of soldiers pointing their guns directly at the 
demonstrators (International Crisis Group 2010:3).
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Abhisit reminded his viewers of his warning that an attempt to end the protests 
might meet resistance because the attacks during the past few weeks made it apparent 
that some groups were ready to use violence. In fact, he had said in the show on March 
7 that a group of people would incite violence during the demonstrations. He said the 
operations met with many obstacles, undeniably including the use of weapons by 
demonstrators. He pointed out that most casualties both on the side of the officials and 
the demonstrators were caused by M79-launched grenades. Clearly, he blamed the loss 
of life in the clashes on April 10 on violent UDD elements, especially Major-General 
Khattiya, and sought to prove that he was right. In his previous television remarks, he 
had consistently implied that these elements were responsible for the violence. 
Furthermore, the government's allegation that Khattiya was behind the recent M79 
attacks was widely publicized.
At the end of his remarks, Abhisit returned to portraying himself as an ethical 
leader. He stressed that all lose of life must be investigated. Currently, neither side 
should accuse the other of being the perpetrator. There must be an independent 
investigation by experts to determine the causes of the deaths. He reaffirmed that the 
government still had a duty to resolve the situation. He stressed that he would bear in 
mind the interests of the nation and the people were above those of his own. Indirectly, 
he refused the UDD's demand for him to step down and leave the country to show 
responsibility for the loss of life in the clashes. 
Special Announcement: April 12
On April 12, Abhisit again spoke live from the studio. Figure 5.2 shows the setting at 
the 11th Infantry Regiment building, which would be used also on April 16 and 19, and 
May 3. On the right side in the background, is a graphic image of the Democracy 
Monument. On the left side is a close up photography of the centrepiece of the same 
monument, showing the constitution in the form of a folded document on top of a 
golden bowl. At the lower part of the background, there are shadows of human figures. 
The Democracy Monument is on Ratchadamnoen Klang Avenue, a major venue for 
mass demonstrations through much of Thailand's history. Due to a lack of truly 
democratic national institutions, the popular meaning of democracy has become 
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anchored in certain places having played a role in democratic struggles, among them 
the Democracy Monument (Kasian 1996 in Dovey 2001:277). 
This setting must have been chosen in order to allow Abhisit to move into the 
symbolic terrain of the UDD, for whom the Democracy Monument was an important 
rallying point. It claimed that it was fighting for democracy and demanded that Abhisit 
step down because he had come to power in an undemocratic way. By choosing the 
Democracy Monument setting, Abhisit now portrayed himself as a democratic leader 
who was acting in accordance with the constitution. The shadows of people in the 
imagery were probably meant to show his support from the people, not just from the 
army as the UDD was claiming. The setting also indirectly signalled that the UDD was 
not democratic since its demonstrations had not been held within the confines of what 
the constitution allowed. Yet Abhisit may well have taken a symbolic step too far when 
trying to appropriate for himself the Democracy Monument so shortly after many 
demonstrators had been killed at the Kok Wua intersection, just some 200 meters 
away. Many people would also remember earlier historical events when democratic 
mass movements had been suppressed in this area, as in May 1992. 
This short address was mainly about the measures the government was going to 
take in response to the current situation. For the first time, Abhisit now used the term 
terrorists (poo-kor-karn-rai). He said it was clear that certain individuals acting as 
terrorists infiltrated the demonstrations and exploited innocent people to instigate 
unrest in the hope of bringing about a great change (karn-plian-plang-klang-yai). The 




innocent people. So, he pleaded with innocent people among the demonstrators to 
refuse to follow the terrorists.
His lexical choices were interesting especially the use of the adjective innocent 
(bo-ri-sud). Instead of calling them 'people' or 'demonstrators', Abhisit called them 
innocent people. He used this term three times in his remarks. It was apparent that he 
was trying to absolve the ordinary demonstrators of guilt even as he needed 
justification for dispersing them. He continued to portray himself as an ethical leader 
who was working for everyone. Furthermore, in addition to denoting the opposite of 
'guilty', the term innocent could also reinforce the image of ordinary UDD 
demonstrators as the naive ban-nok who do not quite understand the workings of 
democracy or rule of law and had been deceived into joining the demonstrations. 
Regarding great change, Abhisit continued to claim that the aim of some UDD 
demonstrators went far beyond than unseating the current government. This claim was 
consistent with his remarks on April 4 that some groups used violence as they 
attempted to bring about 'changes' (karn-plian-plang).
At the end of this remarks, Abhisit reaffirmed the government's determination to 
resolve the situation. He thus implicitly reaffirmed that he would not surrender to the 
demonstrators' demand for him to step down.
Special Announcement: April 16
In the morning of April 16 the UDD leaders managed to escape from their hotel when 
hundreds of police arrived to arrest them. At 9.15 pm, Abhisit spoke live on television 
again. He briefly mentioned the failed attempt to arrest the demonstration leaders, and 
was steadfast that the government would continue its attempts to enforce the law. 
There were two dominant terms his remarks that day: terrorism (karn-kor-karn-
rai) and enforcement of the law (karn-bang-kab chai-kod-mai) appearing seven and 
four times respectively. Abhisit maintained his assertion from April 12 that terrorists 
had infiltrated and exploited innocent demonstrators. He stressed that the government 
would take decisive measures, which he generally called enforcement of the law, to 
tackle terrorism. The terrorism issue was coupled with the need to the preserve the rule 
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of law, national security and protection of the country's principal institutions.
Abhisit said he decided to make certain adjustments to the organizational 
structure of CRES in order to make its operations more unified and integrated, 
especially in dealing with problems of terrorism. Therefore, he appointed Major-
General Anupong Paochinda as Chief Official in charge of operations. Some observers 
viewed this move as an attempt to force Anupong, who was reluctant to use force to 
disperse the demonstration, to take tougher action. This, it was thought, could widen 
the rift between the government and the army (Bangkok Post, April 17, 2010). 
At the end of this remark, Abhisit reassured the public of the government's 
determination to resolve the situations, and to address grievances. He said that certain 
attempts to resolve situations involving terrorism failed because mass mobilization 
complicated the operation. Therefore, he said to the public that “sometimes (we) have 
to be patient and accept certain effects that may arise due to the officials operation.”1 
Again, he referred to military operations as official operations. This could be 
understood as an implicit plea for public understanding on the mishandling of the 
situation on April 10, and of similar events in future operations.
Special Announcement: April 19
On April 19, thousands of troops and police were deployed to protect Silom, a major 
financial district near Ratchaprasong, after UDD leaders had announced a plan to 
expand their rally from Ratchaprasong to Silom. CRES informed the public that the 
soldiers sent to protect Silom were allowed to use live bullets in self-defence. This led 
the UDD to cancel the plan (Bangkok Post, April 20, 2010). In the evening, a pre-
recorded special interview with Abhisit was broadcast. He was interviewed by a TV 
host who later became the candidate for the Democrat Party in parliamentary election. 
The viewers could tell that he fully supported Abhisit. When Abhisit answered his 
questions, the host often nodded or said ah to signal his agreement and awe.
Abhisit assert that Thaksin was exploiting the UDD demonstrations. He said the 
demonstration consisted of broad two groups. One had joined the rally because of real 
grievances regarding poverty and social injustice. The other had joined because they 
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had politically-motivated ulterior motives, and links with the former PM (ar-dit-na-
yok) who himself had political motives, related to the 2006 coup against him and his 
various court cases. Even though Abhisit did not say Thaksin's name, everyone could 
tell from the context that the former PM was him. Abhisit also now claimed that the 
incident on April 10 showed how the movement had widened its activities to include 
the use of force, and implied that extreme factions of the UDD were behind the attacks 
that day. He mentioned some previous activities of the UDD including a (Red Shirts) 
school and a (Red Shirts Guard) training camp without explicitly naming the group to 
support his claim.
Furthermore, Abhisit interpreted the incident on April 10 as a deliberate attempt 
to turn him into a murderer, and put pressure on him to step down to take 
responsibility for the loss of life. He observed that before the incidents, there had been 
attempts to incite public hatred and misunderstanding towards him. These included 
production of doctored audio clips featuring his voice as he orders the dispersal of the 
crowd during Bloody Songkran, and accusations of having cruel intentions towards the 
UDD demonstrators. The distribution of the clip (in August 2009) was followed by the 
current UDD campaign. Since its beginning, the demonstration leaders constantly 
incited violence and confrontation. Finally, when the government decided to enforce 
the law on April 10, the black shirts entered the scene and provoked the loss of life. In 
that night, the black shirts were seen among the demonstrators. He said that the 
sequence of events was not coincidental. It was clear that the acts of certain groups 
could be called acts of terrorist. In other words, Abhisit implied that the UDD leaders 
had coordinated with the men in black in a well-planned process to make him guilty of 
murder. The incident on April 10 was the final step of this process. Even further, he 
implied that the UDD campaign had been staged with the hope that he would lose 
patience and stage a crackdown. The UDD leaders had planned to use loss of life 
(from the crackdown) to accuse him of being a murderer and force him to step down.
 In harmony with CRES's narrative of the April 10 incident, Abhisit alleged that 
the black shirts were responsible for the death both of civilians and officials. He said 
that during the operation on April 10, the officials strictly followed the international 
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standard. If they had not done so, the losses on their side might not have been that 
high. However, what he did not mention was the fact that the security forces, while 
withdrawing from the site, had fired live rounds directly against the demonstrators. He 
also did not explain why the losses on the demonstrators' side were far greater than on 
the government side. 
Abhisit was asked about the legitimacy of his government. The UDD claimed 
that his government had come to power with the assistance of the elites (amataya) who 
was also behind the 2006 coup. Abhisit answered this question with an attack on the 
Puea Thai. He distanced himself from the military by reminding the audience that he 
had not supported the 2006 coup. And his government came to power following 
normal practice in democracies with a parliamentary system. He said two premiers 
who took office before him had been disqualified for legal reasons. Therefore, 
parliament had to decide who would form the next government. He said a majority of 
MPs shifted their support to him because “...the previous two governments could not 
move the country forward...”2 
Abhisit pointed out how the current situation was characterized by political and 
security problems, which must be solved simultaneously. While the government was 
working on a political solution, matters of security must also be resolved. In other 
words, the government would continue its operation to reclaim areas occupied by the 
protestors. Abhisit then further reinforced the image of demonstrators as ban-nok who 
were deceived to join the demonstration. He said the demonstrators join the rally 
because of grievances but they sadly became human shields for demonstration leaders, 
and were used to fight in the streets for the political aims of the demonstration leaders 
who enjoyed much better living conditions. (It was reported that the demonstration 
leaders stayed in hotel during the rally.) He stressed that the government needed to 
return (khuen) the area at Ratchaprasong to the public, restore normalcy (kwam-pok-
ka-ti) and enforce the law. After these goals were completed, the demonstrators' 
problems would be addressed. When asked if how the terrorists could be distinguished 
from the demonstrators, Abhisit did not answer. Instead, he asked the public to help 
inform on the demonstrators so the government could first deal with those who had 
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weapons and then address the people's grievances. 
Abhisit implicitly reinforced the claim that some factions in the UDD had anti-
monarchy objectives. He represented himself as a protector of the monarchy. The host 
asked Abhisit about the possibility of seeking royal intervention to resolve the conflict.  
Abhisit said there were attempts to offend the main institution (sa-ta-ban-lak) and that 
the demand of some demonstration leaders went beyond the democratic ones. He said 
no one should accept or support such attempts.
All in all, Abhisit exaggerated his terrorist claim. In fact, he could not clearly 
explain who they were, and he thus could not point out ways to distinguish terrorists 
from ordinary demonstrators. Instead, Abhisit used such vague terms as 'reclaim the 
area', 'restore normalcy', and 'enforce the law' when he talked about measures to 
resolve the situation and deal with the terrorists.
Weekly TV Show: April 25
The show that day started with the interview session, recorded the day before. Abhisit 
was interviewed  together with Major-General Anupong by a guest host. According to 
an army source, they appeared in the show together to show the public that the 
government and army were united in resolving the situation (Bangkok Post, April 25, 
2010). It was reported that the two men did not see eye to eye. Anupong said in a press 
conference on April 12 that political crises should be solved by political means, which 
some thought implied that he thought Abhisit should step down and call for elections 
(Ibid). Figure 5.3 is a screenshot of the interview session with Abhisit at the centre and 
Anupong in a military uniform on the right. As observed by the army source, they 
seemed uncomfortable in each other's company and did not look straight into each 
other's faces. They appeared to always keep a distance (Bangkok Post, April 29, 2010).
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On April 22, an anti-UDD rally at Sala Daeng intersection, opposite UDD's 
rally camp, was attacked with five grenades killing one and injuring 80 people. Asked 
how he assessed the current situation, Abhisit made clear that there were terrorists 
among the demonstrators. He said it was clear from the incidents on April 10 and 22 
that “those using weapons of war are present in the rally area, and have shown acts of 
violence”3
Abhisit implied that the terrorists were responsible for all loss of life both on the 
government's and demonstrators' side on April 10 and that the attacks at Silom on 
April 22 were proof of their cruelty. Asked to comment on both incidents, he said he 
had underestimated the situations on April 10 and had not expected that there would be 
an armed group present, ready to use weapons to cause loss of life among security 
forces and demonstrators. As for the incident at Silom, he did not expect that there 
would be a group of people capable of firing against the people. Talking about the 
terrorists in this way means that the terrorists did not have any conscience. They were 
killing innocent people, and were very dangerous. Therefore, the demonstration must 
be dissolved as soon as possible.
Anupong supported Abhisit by saying that on 10 April, the security officers had 
been attacked by armed group. They had not been able to use weapons because the 
terrorists had been among ordinary demonstrators. They had feared that if they had 
used weapons, the demonstrators would have been harmed. What Anupong said was in 
line with what CRES had told the public. On April 14, a CRES spokesperson admitted 
that some soldiers had fired live rounds to the demonstrators but only to provide cover 




10 (Bangkok Post, April 15, 2010).
However, Abhisit's answer regarding terrorism was ambiguous. The host asked 
him who the terrorists were. Abhisit said that the investigation and questioning of 
persons recently arrested in connection with the April incident for possessing arms 
would clarify things. He added that somebody had already worked openly and had 
announced already late last year that he was training people to act in connection with 
political gatherings. What Abhisit said here referred no doubt to Khattiya, who had 
said in February 2010 that he recruited security guards for the upcoming rally (Human 
Rights Watch 2011:43). 
Abhisit continued to insist that the UDD's demands went beyond the dissolution 
of parliament. He said the UDD leaders also talked about taking state power, helping 
resolve problems of certain individuals or referred to such term as rud-thai-mai (new 
Thai state). Rud-thai-mai had been mentioned by Abhisit in his TV shows on March 21 
and April 4. This term made headlines on April 20 as hundreds of stickers with white 
letters on red background were found on Silom Road next to the rally site (Bangkok 
Post, April 21, 2010a). As in Figure 5.41, the sticker read 'President Thaksin 
Shinawatra, leader of the new Thai state.' The UDD denied any knowledge of the 
sticker and claimed that it must be a provocation by authorities to draw on public 
criticisms towards the movement. Thaksin also issued a statement condemning this act 
which he termed as a campaign to slander him (The Nation, April 21, 2010).
 Figure 5.4
1 taken from Bangkokbiznews (2010) 'Thaksin Pra Nam Sticker Por Tor Nor Thaksin Rud Thai Mai' [Thaksin Denounced 
'Thaksin, President of the New Thai State'], 20 April. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/politics/politics/20100420/110858/  ทักษิณประณามสติ๊กเกอร์ปธน . ทักษิณ - รัฐไทย 
ใหม่  .html (Accessed 7 March 2013)
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     At the end of the interview, Abhisit emphasized that the government's objective 
was broader than returning Ratchaprasong to the public. It would maintain the rule of 
law and protect the country's principal institution from being drawn into political 
conflict. He assured that all agencies were working in unison and shared a common 
understanding of how to resolve political and security problems. He ended his 
interview by saying “...As I said that if I could not solve the problem, I would not stay. 
I said so not because I was discouraged but I mean it. I know my duties. If I can not 
fulfil them, I should not stay. Therefore, as long as I am PM, I will perform my duties. 
I confirm that my goal is about the future of the country and all Thai people not 
myself.”4
One journalist interpreted this interview as a venue for Abhisit to press 
Anupong to make commitments on the operation to dissolve the Ratchaprasong 
demonstration (Bangkok Post, April 29, 2010). However, Anupong successfully 
maintained his uncommitted position which eventually led Abhisit to propose a 
reconciliation plan on May 3.
The second part of the show was the individual talk session where Abhisit 
spoke live. He spoke negatively of the UDD when explaining why he could not accept 
its latest demand that he dissolved Parliament within 30 days. He said the government 
could not concede to “a group which used threats and violence to intimidate the 
government and the people.”5 In other words, he emphasized the role of the violent 
factions of the UDD in order to reject a proposal from the movement as a whole. 
Furthermore, he appealed to the public when saying that the government and the 
demonstrators were not the only ones who could attempt to find a political solution. 
He must listen to all parties not just allow things to be settled between his government 
and the UDD.
At the end of the session, he appealed to a value of unity when asking for 
cooperation from the public. He assured it that the government was working 
continuously to resolve the situation. He was aware of the unhappiness and worries of 
the majority of people. The government would not ignore these feelings. He would like 
to stress that the most important power to solve problems is the power of harmony and 
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unity. Even though he knew that people sharing the same aim might not have to use 
the same means to pursue it, if we do not cooperate with each other, he said, it will be 
more difficult to solve the problem. In this portion of his talk, which lasted 1 minute 
and 10 seconds, there were many terms connoting value of unity: an-nueng-an-deaw 
(oneness), sa-mak-sa-man (harmony), sa-mak-ki (unity), aek-ka-pap (unity), ruam- 
pa-lang (joining force), and ruam-mue (cooperation).
Weekly TV Show: May 2
On 29 April, more than 200 Red Shirts guards raided Chulalongkorn Hospital, located 
next to the rally site, claiming they had to search the building because soldiers were 
hiding inside. However, the search turned up nothing (The Nation, April 30, 2010). 
The first portion of Abhisit's show on May 2 dealt mainly with this raid. This portion 
lasted 9 minutes and 5 seconds. Word choices and video footage were employed to 
portray the demonstrators in a negative way. Despite speaking in his normal soft voice, 
Abhisit used emotionally laden terms to describe the incident as distressing public 
sentiment (kra-tob- kra-toen jit-jai) 5 times, and being distressing (sa-toen jai) once.
Abhisit said  that during the past week there were a few incidents regarding the 
demonstration at Ratchaprasong which distressed public sentiment (kra-tob-kra-toen 
jit-jai). The incident at Chulalongkorn Hospital was 'the most distressing (sa-toen-jai) 
incident of the past week.'6 Abhisit implicitly denounced the demonstrators with 
negative lexical choices, and at the same time denied the UDD's claim that security 
forces were hiding in the hospital. He said “I must tell you frankly that neither the 
hospital director nor the government anticipated that this kind of incident could 
occur.”7 In other words, raiding a hospital was beyond the imagination of people with 
good conscience. As he spoke, footage of this incident appeared on the screen as in 
Figure 5.5. The footage showed the chaotic situation when the demonstrators stormed 




The raid of Chulalongkorn Hospital drew such heavy public criticism that the 
UDD leaders made an apology the following day (Bangkok Post, May 1, 2010). A day 
after the raid, the Hospital decided to evacuate all of its patients. The evacuation was 
widely reported, with live images of terminally ill patients being transported out 
(Human Rights Watch 2011:73). The report of this incident and the evacuation 
operation through the media could lead the public to assume that the demonstrators 
'stormed into the hospital fully armed, threatening doctors and patients with weapons 
causing horrific chaos as people tried to escape the armed invasion' (Thongchai 2010). 
The use of footage and negative lexical choices in the show would arouse public 
animosity towards the demonstrators the same way the media did.  
During the intermission, a 40-second advertisement was aired. This was footage 
of scenes from Ratchaprasong mass rally site with a voice-over telling the 
demonstrators to leave the rally at Ratchaprasong area as it was illegal, and those who 
joined would be charged with criminal offence. Figure 5.6 and 5.7 are screenshots 
taken from the video. Figure 5.6  shows an old man, topless, sitting and eating. The red 
letters on the screen read 'those joining the rally are committing an offence of criminal 
law.' Figure 5.7, presented shortly after Figure 5.6, shows demonstrators in their 
temporary residence at the rally site. They are not well dressed. Some sit while others 
sleep on the street. The red letters are a part of a full sentence which read (italicized 




Both pictures add to the image of ban-nok  as dirty, ugly and uneducated. Even 
though the direct message of this video was to persuade the demonstrators to leave 
Ratchaprasong, it implicitly reinforced the stereotype of the UDD as hired protesters 
from the rural area. In other words, this video portrays the demonstrators in a negative 
way. They were not only breaking the law but were also ban-nok paid to join the rally, 
disrupting the lives of urbanites. It can be argued that the video implicitly called for 
public support to the future dispersal operation.
Even though Abhisit said he had a clear approach to deal with demonstration at 
Ratchaprasong, and he had already made the decision to take action, it might be a 
bluff. It was reported that the Defence Minister and Army Chief Anupong maintained 
their opposition to the use of force to reclaim the Ratchaprasong area (Bangkok Post, 
May 1, 2010a). 
Special Announcement: May 3
Abhisit gave a televised remark at 9.15 pm to propose, in his own words, a political 
answer (kam-torb-tang-karn-muang) to the crisis which was a reconciliation plan (kra-
buan-karn-prong-dong). He said the plan was written after comprehensive discussions 
with many groups of people. This plan had five points. First, the monarchy must be 
protected from being dragged into political conflicts. Second, an equitable and fair 
welfare system will be built. Third, mechanisms to enable the media to operate freely 
and constructively will be set up. Fourth, an independent fact-finding commission on 
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incidents related to the demonstrations will be established. Fifth, all perceived 
injustices in the previous constitutions and relevant laws will be reviewed. Abhisit said 
that if this plan was accepted and peace was restored, the election would be held on 
November 14.
At the end of his address, he addressed himself directly to two groups, the 
demonstrators whom he called sue-daeng (Red Shirts), and those who opposed the 
demonstrations - together with those who supported the government. He said the 
nature of reconciliation was that it gives no one complete satisfaction. It demanded a 
degree of retreat and sacrifice from all sides. However, he sincerely believed that the 
reconciliation plan was the best solution for the country. He implicitly told the UDD 
that his proposal was not up for negotiation by insisting that the plan would be 
implemented no matter whether the demonstrators accepted it or not. The November 
14 election date would be postponed, however, if they did not accept the proposal. 
Finally, Abhisit asked all sides to consider his plan by implicitly citing loyalty to the 
King as a reason. With a firm yet pleading tone of voice, he said he hoped his plan 
would be accepted by all sides so that the whole nation could happily celebrate 
Coronation Day (on May 5) together. The Coronation Day in 2010 was special as it 
marked the 60th anniversary of the King's coronation. In saying this, he implied that if 
the UDD did not accept his plan, they were disloyal to the King. However, Abhisit 
may be said to have offered a graceful exit for the UDD after they were so severely 
condemned for the raid of Chulalongkorn Hospital. Besides, dissolving the 
demonstration on the Coronation Day would show the movement's loyalty to the 
monarchy.
In this remark, there were many terms connoting value of unity and its opposite 
condition as when he explained the details of the reconciliation plan and asked the 
public for their cooperation. Prong-dong (reconcile) is obviously a term connoting the 
value of unity. In his address, Abhisit used the word 21 times. Moreover, he employed 
other terms that communicated value of unity when he described and asked Thai 
people to accept the plan so that normalcy and peacefulness would be restored. He 
employed three terms which mean all or all sides namely took-fai (10 times), puak-rao 
Reading Abhisit
75
(3 times), and took-kon (3 times). Furthermore, he used three terms which meant (to) 
cooperate: ruam-mue (3 times), chuay-kan (7 times), and ruam-kan (2 times). On the 
contrary, Abhisit employed three terms connoting a sense of disunity, namely, kad-
yang (conflict) 16 times, tak-yak (division) 4 times, and run-raeng (violent) 4 times. 
Figure 5.8 shows Abhisit during his TV appearance. As observed by a 
journalist, he was 'almost back to his brimming-with-confidence self' (The Nation, 
May 4, 2010). Dressed formally with his pink tie, he sat in a studio in front of the 
picture of the Democracy Monument and the national flag. As he spoke, iconological 
elements interacted with the lexical elements (content of the plan) to convey the idea 
that the reconciliation plan was the best solution to the conflict. This is because the 
proposal was offered by an ethical and democratic leader. The pink tie signified that he 
was loyal to the King. As the first point of the reconciliation plan was to protecting the 
Monarchy from being dragged into political problems, the pink tie also interacted with 
the content to portray him as the protector of the Monarchy. When Abhisit said that 
this plan was made based on the benefit of the public at large and not himself, the 
Democracy Monument, the shadows of people, and the national flag in the background 
supported his claim. As mentioned earlier, the Red Shirts did not accept Abhisit as 
their PM. Besides, Thais had been deeply political divided since the 2006 coup. 
Therefore in many of his remarks, Abhisit had to emphasize that he made every 
decision based on the benefit of the public at large. This was to show that he was an 
impartial leader, standing above the fray. Plus, he relied on the public in order to tackle 




Based on a government source, before Abhisit proposed the reconciliation plan, 
the representatives of the government and the UDD leaders had been in talks regarding 
the timing of the dissolution of the parliament. The deal had been sealed by the talk 
between Korbsak Sabhavasu, the PM's secretary-general and Veera Musikhapong, one 
of the core leaders of the UDD (Bangkok Post, May 8, 2010).
Weekly TV Show: May 9
The UDD leaders, accepted the reconciliation plan in principle and the proposed 
election date on November 14 but would continue the rally until Abhisit announced a 
firm date for a dissolution of parliament (Bangkok Post, May 6 2010). Later they 
agreed to end the rally by May 15 but did not specify the date. During the week, 
Abhisit met with representatives of the PAD (Yellow Shirt) and pro-government 
multicolour shirts. PAD rejected this plan because it claimed this plan was proposed 
after the government and representatives of Thaksin had made a deal to share political 
benefits (Bangkok Post, May 7, 2010). In his phone call broadcast at a meeting of the 
Puea Thai Party, Thaksin said that he favoured the proposal but added that it was up to 
the UDD whether or not to accept it (The Nation, May 5, 2010). In contrast to Thaksin, 
Khattiya disagreed with the reconciliation plan and said that the demonstration could 
not end unless ordered to do so by Thaksin (Human Rights Watch 2011:78).
The show began with the individual talk session where Abhisit spoke live. He 
appeared to be more confident, and spoke fluently with a commanding yet pleasant 
voice. He began by talking about the Coronation Day celebration, and the events 
which the government held to celebrate this occasion. As he spoke, footage showed the 
King, along with members of the royal family, going from Siriraj Hospital where the 
King resided to the Grand Palace where the ceremony would be held (Figure 5.9). 
Along the route, they were greeted by thousands of people waving the royal and 
national flags. Furthermore, there was footage of ceremonies that the government had 
held to celebrate the occasion (Figure 5.10). 
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Figure 5.9 shows the King in an official attire. He was accompanied by the 
Queen and the Crown Prince (next to the Queen on her right). It can be argued that the 
footage of the King in this episode served the same function as that of the show on 
February 28, showing the palace's support for Abhisit. In other words, showing this 
footage in the show implied to the viewers that the reconciliation plan had been 
endorsed by the palace. Therefore, all sides should accept the plan so that Thailand 
would return to the old days when everyone was united under the Monarchy and 
celebrated the royal events together.
Then, Abhisit reiterated five points of the reconciliation plan. As he explained 
the first point, he presented himself as the guardian of the monarchic institution. At the 
same time, he attacked Thaksin and the UDD leaders of having anti-monarchy 
intentions. He said the network (kruea-kai) which the government had recently 
discovered made those behind a movement to violate the monarchy become clearer, 
and those who know individuals in the network should cooperate with the authorities. 
The network he was talking about was the anti-monarchy network (pang-lom-chao) 
which was made known to the media by CRES on April 26. It was a chart mapping 45 
individuals and groups, including key leaders of UDD, members of the Puea Thai 
party and Thaksin (Bangkok Post, April 27, 2010). 
The monarchy, one of the central elements of Thainess, has been employed by 
Thai state to suppress political opposition, make them become un-Thai. Monarchy has 
been a sensitive issue in Thailand. Anti-monarchy accusation can stimulate extreme 
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emotions among the public and lead to bloodshed for instance during the student 
massacre of 1976, which a massive number of university students were killed because 
of an accusation that they were communists and wanted to overthrow the monarchy 
(Bangkok Post, April 30, 2010). In the same way as previous power holders, Abhisit 
used the monarchy to attack Thaksin and the UDD. However, the idea of the anti-
monarchy network appeared to be just wishful thinking. The case was dropped for lack 
of evidence two years later (Bangkok Post, March 31, 2012). 
In the second half of the individual talk session started, Abhisit talked about a 
grenade attack on May 7. The attack, which occurred near Ratchaprasong rally site, 
killed two policemen and injured 13 people. CRES suspected that Gen Khattiya and 
hard-core members of the UDD were behind but Khattiya denied any involvement 
(Bangkok Post, May 9, 2010).
Abhisit said the attack was the attempt to derail his reconciliation process. He 
said the only ones who did not want the plan to succeed were the terrorists. They did 
not want the rally to end. This is because they would be alienated and would not be 
able to continue to use demonstrators as human shields if the rally dispersed. Then, he 
said that Khattiya and Thaksin were among those who did not want the rally to end. 
This was almost like saying that they were terrorists. Abhisit mentioned their names 
when he said “...Seh Daeng (Khattiya) is the one who is clearly against the 
reconciliation process. Seh Daeng has clearly said so and (he) has sought coordination 
from regional (UDD) leaders to oppose the key leaders in Bangkok. The important 
thing is that Seh Daeng said he would listen to Thaksin so I can say that Thaksin is not 
satisfied with the reconciliation plan because it is not the answer to Thaksin's personal 
interests at all...”8 Later, one of the UDD leaders commented that Abhisit should not 
have made this comment as it could spoil the atmosphere when both sides was 
working on how to end the conflict (Bangkok Post, May 10, 2010).
He gave an ultimatum to the UDD to end the demonstration. He said for the 
government to be able to hold elections on November 14  “a definitive answer should 
be given by today or tomorrow”9 He said the movement's proposal to dissolve the 
demonstration by May 15 was too late based on threats posed by terrorism. Any 
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further delays would lead to further damages to the economy and risks for 
demonstrators' and civilians' safety, and the government might not be able to hold the 
election on 14 November. In other words, the demonstration must end on May 10 
unless the demonstrators wanted a crackdown.
At the end of his TV talk, Abhisit rejected an allegation made by some groups 
that he had hidden agendas or vested interests in the plan. He said these groups called 
him a coward and told him to resign because they thought that he tried to get himself 
out of trouble and leave the problems to the people. He maintained his refusal to 
resign. He said his resignation or a change of government was what those hostile to the 
country wanted the most. This group hoped that a new leader would make decisions 
leading to violence since this could provoke a people's war (song-kram-pra-cha-chon). 
This term had been used by some UDD leaders on stage. In other words, he implied 
that some UDD leaders did not want to dissolve the demonstrations because they 
wanted to have people's war.
Furthermore, he said he did not run away from the problem. By proposing the 
reconciliation plan, he confronted it by making a decision based on the benefit of the 
public but not of himself or his party. He reaffirmed that he would continue to 
implement the plan. Once again he made negative comments about Thaksin as he said 
those who wanted to derail the reconciliation were the terrorists and a person now 
living overseas. On his final note, he said it was clear to everyone that this crisis was 
difficult but “I am determined to bring the country out of the present crisis and I stand 
ready to be accountable for every decision I make.”10 The true nature of his decision 
was disclosed on May 12.
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6 Analysis of the Third Period
 After almost two months of continuous demonstrations and rallies, the UDD 
campaign came to a tragic end. Before analysing Abhisit's television addresses in the 
third phase, development related to 'Operation Ratchaprasong' will be presented.
6.1 The Beginning of 'Operation Ratchaprasong'
In response to Abhisit's demand for the demonstrators to disperse on May 10, the UDD 
leaders announced that they would end their protests if Deputy Prime Minister Suthep, 
the head of CRES turned himself in to the authorities to take responsibility for the 
deaths in the clashes on April 10. On May 11, Suthep reported to the Department of 
Special Investigation (DSI). Claiming that DSI might be lenient towards Suthep, UDD 
leaders demanded him to turn himself in to the Crime Suppression Bureau (The 
Nation, May 11, 2010). The UDD leaders were divided over whether or not to end the 
demonstrations. This disagreement led the demonstrations to continue (The Nation, 
May 13, 2010). Those leaders, who thought Suthep's action had satisfied their 
demands, and supported the dissolution of the demonstrations, quitted their leadership 
role and left the rally site. These leaders included Veera Musikaphong (Bangkok Post, 
May 14, 2010). In fact, in addition to hard-line UDD leaders, the deal to end the 
demonstration was blocked by three hard-core elements of the UDD: members of 
Thaksin's family, alleged anti-Monarchy group Red Siam, and a faction loyal to Major-
General Khattiya (Naruemon & McCargo 2011:997).
On May 12, the government withdrew its offer to call a fresh election on 
November 14, and would step up measures, including cutting power and water supply, 
to press the demonstrators to leave the demonstration site at Ratchaprasong. Even 
though Abhisit confirmed that the demonstrators would be removed from 
Ratchaprasong, he did not confirmed if the military forces would be used in this 
operation (The Nation, May 14, 2010). According to the army source, Anupong 
approved 'Operation Ratchaprasong' involving 32,000 troops and 120 armoured 
personnel carriers to seal off the rally site (Bangkok Post, May 13, 2010) and had been 
planned on a model of urban warfare (Bangkok Post, May 27, 2010). The clashes on 
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April 10 had raised the army's alertness on the UDD's fighting capacity. They thought 
that the UDD possessed armed forces fully equipped with war weapons. 
On May 13, a state of emergency was declared in 15 more provinces to block 
additional UDD supporters from joining the rally in Bangkok (The Nation, May 14, 
2010a). From 6 pm, CRES started its operation to 'cordon off' (kra-chab-vong-lom) the 
Ratchaprasong area. Its measures included cutting off water and power supply, and 
setting up more security checkpoints around the demonstration area. Just an hour after 
this operation had begun, Khattiya was shot in the forehead by a sniper while he was 
giving an interview to foreign media just outside the rally area (The Nation, May 14, 
2010b). Earlier that day, Khattiya had said that if the key UDD leaders decided to end 
the campaign, he would take over together with other hard-line UDD leaders and lead 
the demonstrations (Bangkok Post, May 14, 2010a). One political analyst speculated 
that the shooting of Khattiya would end the rally since the UDD would no longer have 
a military leadership (Bangkok Post, May 14, 2010b). However when the news of the 
assassination of Khattiya reached the main rally site, the UDD leaders vowed to fight 
on. Khattiya died on May 17. On May 14, CRES had announced that the soldiers were 
allowed to fire live rounds under certain circumstances including when they had a 
clear visual sight of 'terrorists'. In practice, the army began deploying snipers to fire at 
anyone trying to enter the zone prohibited by the army (Human Rights Watch 
2011:16).
Operation Ratchaprasong lasted until May 19. Developments from May 15 to 
19 will be discussed now. 
6.2 Data Discussion
In this period, there are four television appearances including one episode of his TV 
show and three special announcements (Table 6.1). In the second period, Abhisit made 
his last appearance on May 9. It took a week before the next occurred on May 15, two 
days after the Operation Ratchaprasong had started. During the operation (May 13 to 
19), he spoke on television only three times. 
Reading Abhisit
82
No Date (mm/dd/yy) and Time 
(hrs.)
Name of televised address Duration 
(minute: second)
1 05/15/10, 20.30 Special Announcement 18:42
2 05/16/10, 09.00 Weekly TV Show 30:11
3 05/19/10, 22.10 Special Announcement 08:12
4 05/21/10, 14.00 Special Announcement 08:40
Total duration of period 3 (hour: minute: 
second)
01:05:45
Table 6.1: Abhisit's television remarks analysed in the third period
Abhisit's statement on May 21 lasted 10 minutes and 10 seconds. However, the 
last one and a half minute were in English and are not included in this study. His TV 
show on May 16 included a video of the song Ruam-Pen-Thai (united as Thai) lasting 
6 minutes and 20 seconds.
6.3 Analysis of the Data
Special Announcement: May 15
At 8.30 pm, Abhisit gave his first remark since the operation started. It had been 
reported by the media just before that the political clashes between the soldiers and the 
demonstrators since the evening of May 13 had resulted in 22 deaths and 172 injured 
(The Nation, May 16, 2010). Dressed formally as usual, Abhisit stood behind a 
podium, with the seal of the Office of the Prime Minister attached (Figure 6.1). This 
was the first time he stood up when making his address. Even though the setting was 
the same as before, the shift from sitting to standing conveyed an increased sense of 
urgency. Viewers could see both the pictures of the Democracy Monument and the 
national flag (in the upper right corner of Figure 6.1). For comparison, see Figure 6.2, 
a screenshot from his remarks on April 16, when the flag was barely visible.
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As argued in chapter 5, the Democracy Monument signified democratic 
leadership. However, in this period, the military operation was underway against a 
movement claiming to be democratic, and Abhisit was responsible. Therefore, in 
communicating to Thai people, the visual elements of Abhisit's remarks must signify 
not only just democratic legitimacy or even ethical qualities but also authority. The 
Monument and the flag interacted with the seal to signify Abhisit's authority and 
legitimacy as the prime minister of Thailand. The seal along with his official gesture 
implied to the audiences that what Abhisit was going to say was important. Note also 
how the PM's official seal, a sign of authority (Figure 6.1) has replaced the folded 
hands (on Figure 6.2), a sign of calm.
In his statement, Abhisit used the presence of 'armed groups and terrorists' 
among the demonstrators to justify the operations by CRES, and at the same time 
delegitimised the demonstration. Abhisit mentioned the term armed group (kong-kam-
lang-tid-ar-wut) six times and terrorist (poo-kor-karn-rai) twice. Such terms could 
heighten audiences' attention to the dangers and threats from the demonstrators. A shift 
had occurred from the invasion of ban-nok to the infiltration of terrorists. In response, 
more aggressive measures were therefore needed.
Even though the causes of most deaths were unknown, the armed groups and 
terrorist elements were blamed for the losses. Abhisit said that what the officials were 
doing was to cordon off (kra-chab-vong-lom) the demonstration area. The authorities 
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have not entered the demonstration area, they only set up the security checkpoints 
around it. They were attacked at the checkpoints by armed groups, terrorist elements, 
and protesters using war weapons. Therefore, it was necessary for the security forces 
to protect themselves in accordance with the announced rule of engagement. In other 
words, losses caused by the government side were due to self-defence. Earlier that day, 
CRES announced on television that the demonstrators died from four causes, namely, 
infighting among UDD guards, attacks launched by armed groups or terrorists using 
war weapons, demonstrators being attacked by dissatisfied citizens, and finally troops 
defending themselves (The Nation, May 16, 2010). However, such justifications are 
normal when governments repress armed or unarmed assailants.
Abhisit said that as the UDD continued its demonstration, it rejected his 
reconciliation plan. Therefore the government had to implement the operation. He said 
the UDD leaders' rejection of the plan was regrettable because “...it was decided for 
the benefit of a small group of people who wanted to go on creating violence, even 
more losses, and a situation approaching a civil war. This group hoped that it could put 
pressure on the government. What is unacceptable is the fact that lives of civilians are 
being used as a tool to pressure the government...”1
Abhisit continued to delegitimize the demonstration. He said that the 'operation 
to cordon-off the area' was the best way to bring peace and normalcy back to the 
society for the benefit of all, with as little loss as possible. It would continue as it was 
necessary. Abhisit appeared determined as he emphatically stated: “We cannot allow 
residents of Bangkok to be held hostage by people who do not respect the law. We 
cannot allow armed groups to overthrow a government that they do not like.”2
Abhisit asked the public to be cautious about rumours and untrue stories. He 
claimed that the UDD leaders used distorted information to inflame hatred among 
people against the authorities. He said the government verified the fact of the situation 
before making public statements because the government was responsible for 
conveying accurate and verified information to the public. However, “The protest 
leaders do not have to assume any responsibility, and may say or accuse anyone of 
anything without any factual evidence.”3 He said the UDD leaders accused the 
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government of suppressing and killing unarmed people. Referring to soldiers as 
officials, he said that what the officials were doing was to retaliate (torb-toe) the armed 
groups not unarmed people. He stressed that the government had nothing to gain from 
loss of life, and did not want to see any such loss. But he said “it was now clear that 
people (present at the demonstration site) were used as human shields, and as tools to 
put pressure on the government by the armed group.”4
There was a predominance of the term '(to) end the (current) demonstration' 
(yu-ti-karn-chum-num). Abhisit used this term ten times. What the government was 
doing was aimed at achieving this goal and thus had to be continued. The armed group 
was to blame for most of the casualties. This final point would be emphasized again in 
his next remarks.
Weekly TV Show: May 16
Abhisit talked about the current situation in the first 10 minutes and 15 seconds 
of his May 16 show. In continuation of his remarks from the day before, he maintained 
that the operation to cordon off (kra-chab-vong-lom) the rally site would be continued 
because of the presence of armed groups and terrorists among the demonstrators. 
These groups caused both civilian's and military's loss of life. Therefore, ending the 
demonstration was the best way to resolve the current situation. In his statement the 
terms armed group (kong-kam-lang-tid-ar-wut) and terrorist (poo-kor-karn-rai) 
dominated. They were used seven times each.
Abhisit stressed that the terrorists and armed elements were responsible for 
most losses on both sides. He said that now the armed groups and terrorists had 
greater roles in the demonstration. During the past few days, their use of war weapons 
led to most of the losses. These groups did not care who the victims might be. If they 
were innocent people, they could use civilian casualties as tools to pressure the 
government. On its side, the government had no reason to inflict loss of human life or 
damages. Besides, he asked the demonstrators to understand that their demonstration 
had become a tool of armed groups and terrorists. If allowed to continue, this would 
lead Thai society to state of violence and lawlessness. Therefore, the best alternative in 
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the current situation was for the demonstration to end.
The video footage displayed during this remarks is interesting. It featured 
certain areas around Ratchaprasong demonstration site, where clashes took place 
between the demonstrators and the military. The purpose was to back up Abhisit's 
claim concerning the violent acts of the demonstrators. In these video clips, it is almost 
as if there were no soldiers present. Whenever they appear, they are in a submissive or 
defensive position (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).
Figure 6.3 shows troops holding shields as they move forward. On figure 6.4, a 
soldier lies on the ground unconscious. This ended a one-and-a-half minute footage of 
an incident where angry demonstrators assaulted soldiers who did not fight back. Even 
though Abhisit made no direct mention of these video clips, it was no coincidence that 
they appeared when Abhisit said that the security forces were defending the rule of law 
and had no intention to harm anyone. Both pictures showed a stark contrast between 
the aggressive actions of the demonstrators and the defensive posture of the troops, 
who acted professionally.
At the end of the show, a music video of the song Ruam-Pen-Thai (united as 
Thai) was shown. Lasting 6 minutes and 20 seconds, its iconological and textual 
elements called for unity among Thai people around the monarchy. The song said that 
everyone was Thai and was under the love and care of the King. Therefore, everyone 
should love each other and be united. In the same way as the earlier music video of 
Love Each Other, this video showed pictures of people waving national and royal 
flags, and some carrying pictures of the King and the Queen.
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Perhaps, the most interesting part of the video is one where the artist sings 'the 
sky would turn dark if (we) become divided.'5 This verse accompanied black-and-
white pictures of violent acts carried out by UDD demonstrators such as in Figure 6.5. 
It shows the clashes on April 10 at Khok Wua Intersection (see the street sign at the 
centre). It should be noted that only this part of the video was in black-and-white 
whereas the rest of the video was in colour. The pictures thus interacted with the lyrics 
(the sky will turn dark) to demonstrate how the demonstrators were causing disunity 
among Thai people. It was now urgent for the demonstrations to end so the Thai 
society could once again be unified.
Special Announcement: May 19
An attempt of the senators to mediate talks between the government and the UDD 
failed. The government maintained that it would enter the talks after the UDD leaders 
had called an end to the demonstrations. On May 18, the PM's Office Minister Satit 
said on television that the government had tried to engage in talks with the UDD 
leaders to end the violence. However, the attempt had been rejected by the UDD due to 
interference from 'a mastermind overseas' (Bangkok Post, May 19, 2010). This 
referred to Thaksin.
On May 19 at 3.30am, the soldiers started the final operation as they moved 
from Lumpini Park adjacent to Ratchaprasong rally site. They faced with resistance 
from armed men with bombs and M-79 launched grenades. As the soldiers moved 




announcement on the stage at 1.45 pm. Shortly afterwards, some buildings in the area 
were set on fire whereas some governor's offices were torched by UDD supporters. A 
few hours after the end of the demonstration, a curfew was announced, lasting from 8 
pm to 6 am. Thirty-six buildings in Bangkok including the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand and four governor's offices were attacked by arsonists (Bangkok Post, May 
21, 2010). Although UDD leaders later claimed that the arson attacks were 
spontaneous reactions by angry protesters, many UDD leaders had publicly called for 
such attacks a few months prior to the crackdown and many attacks were well-planned 
and organized (Human Rights Watch 2011:91-92). However, it was unclear if all had 
been made by the UDD (International Crisis Group 2010:6).
At 10.10 pm, Abhisit spoke live on television regarding the final operation. 
Figure 6.6 is a screenshot from this remarks. Abhisit was presented in full shots in 
contrast to previous addresses where he had been presented in medium shots. When 
viewed on TV, he looked smaller than before. He stands behind a podium with the seal 
of the Office of the Prime Minister attached to it. On either side there a Thai national 
flag. Behind him, almost as a halo around the Buddha or a Christian saint, there is yet 
another much larger yellow seal against a blue background. His personal authority has 
been replaced or overshadowed, so to speak, by the authority of the nation and his 
office. When seen at a distance, the white paintings in the two upper corners look like 
small white clouds. They interact with the blue colour in the background to convey a 
sense that he was endowed with a mandate from heaven.




minister's office (the seal) had to be communicated effectively. What had been 
underlined before, the characteristics of a particularly ethical or democratic leader, was 
now left aside. The visual elements of Abhisit's May 19 television appearance elevated 
his role as Prime Minister of Thailand. Sceptical viewers might almost gain the 
impression that he was now acting in spite of himself. 
Yet speaking with confidence, Abhisit began his statement by talking about the 
military operation that had ended the demonstration. He said the government decided 
to cordon off (kra-chab-vong-lom) the demonstration area with a view to having the 
protests end as soon as possible. Although he did not say so, the meaning of the term 
cordon off shifted to become synonymous with crackdown. The term cordon off, which 
had been an accurate description of the early phase of the operation, now continued to 
be used although it no longer reflected what the security forces were actually doing. In 
his remarks on May 15 and 16, Abhisit had actually described how the demonstration 
site was sealed off. At that time, the military did not enter the rally site itself. Now the 
term cordon off received a new meaning as crackdown.
Abhisit portrayed the soldiers as heroes doing their job while he saw the armed 
group and demonstrators as villains. Abhisit said after the demonstrations ended and 
their leaders had turned themselves in, the officials cleared various areas and found a 
large quantity of weapons. Armed elements and some angry demonstrators then 
continued to instigate disturbances including arson attacks. The armed groups used 
weapons to prevent the fire fighters from getting close enough to put the fires out. Yet 
the fire fighters managed to do so, and were determined to mitigate the incidents, and 
help affected people. 
Special Announcement: May 21
Two days after the UDD had been defeated, Abhisit spoke on television again. 
Figure 6.7 is a screenshot from his first post-conflict remarks. The setting was the 
same on May 15 (Figure 6.1). After the government had resumed control, Abhisit 
returned to his role as an ethical and democratic leader as signified by symbols of 
Thainess and democracy. This setting fit with what he was now going to address, 
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healing wounds and being back to normal.
As one foreign journalist observed, by contrast to his solemn, official address 
on May 19, this statement was now more emotional and personal, indeed far more so 
than his normal style (guardian.co.uk 2010). Abhisit began by talking about the current 
situation. Now that the government had restored order and normalcy in Bangkok and 
the provinces after incidents had put the lives of people at risk, he would like to 
express on behalf of the government, officials, and the people the sorrow he felt after 
'one of the worst incidents (Thailand) ever faced6.
At that time, the most shocking news was the incident at Wat Pathum Wanaram, 
the Buddhist temple near the rally area which had earlier been declared a safe zone. 
After the end of the rally on May 19, demonstrators sought refuge in the compound of 
the temple. During the night, there were six deaths including one nurse in or near the 
compound (Bangkok Post, May 23, 2010). Even though the army claimed that the six 
fatalities had been due to an internal dispute in the UDD, this incident raised doubts 
regarding the army's responsible behaviour. According to Human Rights Watch 
(2011:20), at least two of the dead had been shot by soldiers, standing on the elevated 
skytrain tracks.
Abhisit implied that even though 'Operation Ratchaprasong' had caused loss, it 
had been necessary. Besides, those who had died were terrorists. He said many people 
had communicated to him that they understood the necessity for the government and 
CRES to take action to restore normalcy, and to reaffirm that Thailand was a law 




with the law and international standards. In performing its operations, the army had 
been strongly concerned to protect the lives of civilians, especially innocent ones. In 
other words, loss of civilian life had not been caused by the authorities. This portion of 
his address showed how controversial 'Operation Ratchaprasong' was, and the 
necessity for the government to 'fix' the understanding of the general public 
concerning the operation.  
Then, Abhisit talked about rehabilitation (fuen-foo) and healing (yeao-ya) 
process. These formed the main topic of this remark. He referred to the value of unity 
when asking for cooperation from Thai people to join the process of rehabilitation. He 
reiterated that he was concerned for the well-being of all Thais regardless of their 
political views. He said “we can  rebuild (damaged) houses and buildings but now the 
government's priority is to heal the minds and restore oneness (kwam-pen-an-nueng-
an-deow) (among Thai people).”7
Abhisit stressed that the immediate mission was to rehabilitate those people 
who were directly affected by acts of terrorisms, arson attacks, and riots. The 
government would continue to implement the reconciliation plan he had proposed in 
order to address divisions in Thailand. Besides, the objective of rehabilitating the 
country and healing the minds of the people affected by the incident would be added to 
the reconciliation plan. However, he made no mention of when elections would be 
held although this had been a key element of the plan at the time when it was offered 
to the UDD. 
Abhisit now made a strong return to his preferred imaginary role as an ethical 
leader and stressed that the operation undertaken had enabled the government to deal 
with those who violated the law and those who had ill will. As for people having 
different political views and grievances, the government would address their problems. 
Abhisit used the home metaphor as he invited people to join the reconciliation and 
healing process. In this short statement about reconciliation (53 seconds), he employed 
the terms baan (home) eight times:
“I want to tell all Thais that we live in the same home. Our home has been 
damaged. We now pinpoint those who wanted to burn our home, who will be 
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penalized. However, residents of the same home may have different views on what the 
home should look like. We are all neighbours. We must listen to each other's views. We 
will be united in action and spirit to rebuild our home to become liveable for all of us 
Thais.”8
In the first and second periods, the home metaphor had been employed only in 
the 'home' advertisement (Figure 4.3) which used a few times in both periods. In the 
advertisement, there was a graphic picture of a house situated at the centre of a map of 
Thailand under attack by bombs and fire. The advertisement called for cooperation 
from Thai people to inform the authorities of suspicious activities that might cause 
damage to the country. The incidents during May 13-19, as represented by Abhisit, 
turned the graphic image in the home advertisement to a depiction of a living reality. 
As mentioned earlier, 'home' connotes a sense of something precious, which 
must be protected at all cost. The home metaphor justified 'Operation Ratchaprasong' 
as a measure to prevent the burning down of Thailand. And now, after the struggle, the 
home metaphor was employed to ask everyone especially the UDD supporters to leave 
the past behind, and cooperate with the government in restoring the Thai home.
During May 13 to 19, Operation Ratchaprasong resulted in 63 deaths while 530 
people were injured (People's Information Center 2012:418,436). Among those killed, 
there were 2 military officers, 54 civilians, 6 paramedics, and 1 foreign journalist. In 
the final operation on May 19 the soldiers faced less armed resistance than expected, 
and the men in black who had attacked the soldiers on April 10 did not turn up again 
(Bangkok Post, May 23, 2010). This might be because the army had overestimated the 
combat capacity of the UDD. According to an army source, the UDD had only 50 
armed men (Bangkok Post, May 22, 2010). During the Operation, the army had sent 
special agents to monitor the leaders of the armed groups so the armed militants could 
not get into the demonstration area. There are at least three questions which Abhisit 
may have found it inconvenient to take up at the time. First, why was the number of 
civilian casualties so much higher than the military if the main attackers had been 
armed groups among the demonstrators and the army had mainly defended itself? 
Second, who had killed six paramedics and one foreign journalist? And last but not 
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The main findings of the study shall now be discussed in relation to the questions 
posed in the Introduction: 1. How were the UDD campaign during March and May 
2010, and government's measures to counter them interpreted in Abhisit's televised 
addresses? 2. How were the demonstrators and the government particularly Abhisit 
himself portrayed in his appearances on TV? 3 As the conflict escalated, did the 
portrayal of the campaign and the demonstrators become more negative?
The main focus of the analysis above has been the representations of a) the 
UDD campaign, especially the demonstrations, b) the government's operations, and c) 
Abhisit himself as a leader. The period under study has been divided into three phases: 
February 26-April 9, April 10-May 12, and May 13-21. 
7.1 Abhisit: A Modern Thai-Style Leader? 
As mentioned earlier, moral politics has dominated Thailand's middle classes' 
perception of a good political system. In this conception, a good polity is ruled by the 
'Thai-style leader', a generous leader who sacrifices his happiness to work for the 
nation, under the supervision of the righteous king (Saichol:26). Thus, the Monarchy 
has been a more important source of legitimacy than electoral democracy (Thongchai 
2008:29). It was clear to many including the Red Shirts that Abhisit became Prime 
Minister with support from the military who had influenced the shift in the political 
allegiance of some members of parliament. Unlike Thaksin or other leaders in the 
democratic world who gain legitimacy from an electoral mandate, Abhisit could not 
use popular support to claim legitimacy. Instead, he claimed to be a law-abiding and 
democratic Thai-style leader. 
During the UDD campaign, Abhisit did not just portray himself as a Thai-style 
leader to claim legitimacy but also used such image to delegitimize the UDD's demand 
for dissolving parliament. He constantly presented himself as the guardian of the law, 
the monarchy and other central elements of Thainess. A few symbols of Thainess such 




As mentioned earlier, Thai power holders have traditionally seen themselves as 
guardians of the trinity of Nation-Buddhism-King, central elements of Thainess. In 
order to make Abhisit's image as a Thai-style leader clearer, a threat or an enemy to the 
trinity was needed. In his remarks, Abhisit talked about some terms that the UDD 
leaders used on the rally stage especially the 'new Thai state' (pp.42,48,69) to imply 
that the UDD's demand went far beyond the dissolution of the parliament. 
An idea of Thainess with the trinity of Nation-Buddhism-King as its central 
tenets was defined to support a hierarchical structure that did not allow structural 
change. It is so narrow that it could not cope with the emergence of new social classes 
and social values (Saichol:31). As many Red Shirts belong to the emerging social 
class, they find themselves not fit to the existing social structure. Pavin (2011:340) 
argues that democratic and liberal society has been emerging as the 'fourth pillar' of the 
central elements of Thainess. Unlike the trinity of Thainess, which has always been 
represented by the power holders, Thaksin and the UDD, by claiming that they were 
democratic, implicitly proclaimed that they represented a fourth pillar (Ibid).
Abhisit might recognize this change. This study has shown that Abhisit not only 
claimed to represent a fourth pillar but also portrayed the UDD and Thaksin as un-
democratic. Especially from the second phase, the textual and visual elements of his 
statements connoted Abhisit's image as a democratic leader. The background featuring 
the graphic picture of human shadow and the Democracy Monument was used in 6 out 
of 12 remarks for instance on April 12. Regarding textual elements, Abhisit appealed 
to the benefit of the public as he rejected the demand for him to resign and call an 
election immediately. One of his remarks that such image was strongly represented in 
textual elements is that of May 3 when he proposed to begin a process of 
reconciliation, and offered an early election.
In the past, the demonstrations were viewed as a display of the use of freedom 
but had crossed the permissible limit resulting in chaos in society, deterioration of the 
national image, and made Thailand less attractive for investment or tourism 
(Saichol:28). Therefore, forces could be used to disperse the demonstration in order to 
restore peace and order. This view was based on a traditional value of calm viewing 
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stable social values as divine. However, Abhisit's notion of peace and order is different 
from that used by past leaders because it is anchored so strongly in the rule of law. 
From the start, Abhisit adhered to rule of law when talking about the UDD campaign. 
The UDD could hold and maintain its campaign as long as it was lawful. As the 
campaign carried on, it became illegal and an exercise of freedom exceeding rights to 
public assembly given by the constitution. Therefore, the government had to enforce 
the law to restore peace and order in the society. 
As mentioned in chapter one, my assumption is that lexical and visual choices 
used in Abhisit's remarks to characterize the UDD campaign were built upon Thainess 
and related values such as calmness and unity. However, this study has made an 
interesting finding. The rule of law and democracy were included as key element in 
Abhisit's remarks. Abhisit redefined the notion of a Thai-style leader by adding 'pro-
democracy' and 'law-abiding' characteristics to the key elements of Thainess. In 
Abhisit's view, a modern Thai-style leader has to be law abiding and democratic, and 
this is where he felt that he was most different from Thaksin.
As Abhisit did not win the elections, being democratic did not for him mean to 
have a strong electoral mandate. Instead, it meant 'impartial in relation to current 
political conflict'. Abhisit tried to isolate himself from the military. He tried to show 
that his government and he himself did not depend on army support. When the clashes 
led to loss of life, he did not blame all of it on the terrorists. Instead, he reaffirmed that 
all losses would be investigated.
Furthermore, the characteristic of being impartial to current political conflict is 
reflected in his careful choice of words when he talked about the UDD (both as a 
movement and individuals), especially in the first phase of the campaign. That is to say 
Abhisit avoided to mention the UDD' and Thaksin's name when he talked about them. 
As the conflicts escalated, he became more openly negative to Thaksin and UDD 
leaders. Still, Abhisit tried not to portray the ordinary demonstrators in absolute 
negative terms even though he felt a need to disperse them.
Due to social change, it is necessary for a Thai-style leader to adjust. If Abhisit 
had been negative to the ordinary demonstrators and blamed the terrorists and violent 
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demonstrators for all loss of life, he might provoked counter-movements and perhaps 
not have been able to ask all Thais to participate in the rehabilitation and healing 
process as he did on May 21.
7.2 Degree of Negativity of the Demonstration and 
Demonstrators
Negativity is more or less subjective and its degree is difficult to measure. In order to 
make solid arguments, I will focus more on the textual and visual elements which 
explicitly portrayed the demonstrations and demonstrators in a negative way. One of 
the ways to do this is to check if Thaksin's and UDD were explicitly mentioned. This is 
because, as argued earlier, Abhisit was careful not to mention the name of the UDD or 
Thaksin when he talked about them. If the UDD and Thaksin were explicitly portrayed 
in his remarks, we need to ask why.
In the first period, Abhisit portrayed the UDD leaders and Thaksin in a negative 
way in his remark on March 21. He mentioned UDD and Thaksin by name as he 
voiced his doubt that the UDD leaders were working for Thaksin's benefit. The 
demonstrators were partly portrayed as rioters. However, their aggressive actions were 
understandable because they were manipulated by the campaign leaders to join the 
demonstrations in order to achieve the latters' goal. Representing the demonstrators 
this way fitted with the government's strategy of restraint and conflict avoidance. At 
the first stage of the demonstrations, this strategy was pursued in the hope that the 
demonstration would be faded away in Bangkok's summer heat.
Things did not go as the government had hoped as the demonstrations were 
prolonged and expanded to Ratchaprasong. The government had to step up measures 
to control the situation. However, the demonstrators were not portrayed more 
negatively until the incident at THAICOM station on April 9. Abhisit's remarks about 
the demonstrations that day were the most negative in the whole first phase under 
study. 
In the second phase, the term 'terrorists' was introduced after the clashes on 
April 10. The campaign had been infiltrated by cruel and dangerous terrorists. They 
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caused loss of life both on the military' and the demonstrators' side. Because of the 
threat posed by terrorists, the image of the demonstration became more negative than 
in the first phase. 
The image of the UDD leaders became more negative in Abhisit's remarks 
when he implied that they supported the terrorists. However, the representation of the 
ordinary demonstrators did not become more negative. They were portrayed as human 
shields used by the terrorists, and this made the government careful in its choice of 
measures to fight the terrorists. Before his remarks on May 9, Abhisit asked the public, 
especially those who wished to see an end to the rally at Ratchaprasong, to be patient 
as the government was trying to resolve the situation. By portraying the demonstrators 
as human shields, Abhisit concealed the government's inability to deal with the 
situation. As mentioned earlier, it was reported that the military was reluctant to use 
force to disperse the demonstrations at Ratchaprasong despite the government's wish 
for it to do so.
 The demonstrators were portrayed in a highly negative way on Abhisit's TV 
show on May 2. He used emotive terms to talk about the raid of Chulalongkorn 
Hospital on April 29. As he spoke, the footage of the incident was shown. 
Furthermore, the advertisement showing pictures of demonstrators at the rally site 
reinforced the stereotypical image of ban-nok. The advertisement connoted the idea 
that the demonstrators were vulgar outsiders in the business district. 
The negative portrayal of the demonstration in Abhisit's remarks on May 9 was 
linked to his ultimatum to the UDD leaders to end the demonstrations by May 10. 
Abhisit talked about the grenade attacks on May 7. He said they must have been 
carried out by terrorists, and explicitly linked Thaksin to them. In this remarks, Abhisit 
made clear that the threats posed by the terrorists were too great to allow the 
demonstration to continue . 
In addition to the term 'terrorists', the term 'armed group' was used in Abhisit's 
remarks in the third phase. Just as in the second phase, threats posed by terrorists were 
employed in the remarks to portray the demonstrations in a negative way. Abhisit 
emphasized that the security officers were now fighting with the terrorists and armed 
groups not with unarmed civilians. As for the demonstrators, they continued to be 
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portrayed as human shields. At the same time, they were now shown as rioters. For 
instance, Abhisit's TV Show on May 16 showed footage of soldiers being beaten by 
demonstrators. 
To answer the question if  the representation of the campaign and demonstrators 
became more negative as the conflict escalated, I have found that the representations 
of the demonstrations in the second and third phases were more negative than in the 
first. However, it cannot be said that the representation of the demonstrations became 
even more negative in the third than the second phase. They were similar. Therefore, 
the reason why it took more than a month after Abhisit had first claimed that the 
demonstration was infiltrated by terrorists before the rally was dispersed cannot be that 
the image of the demonstrators turned more negative. The reason for the delay was 
probably mainly disagreements between the government and the army.
I have found that the representation of the demonstration leaders was the most 
negative in the second and third period. Abhisit said that the reason why the UDD 
leaders did not end the demonstrations was that they hoped to use the loss of life to put 
pressure on the government. He therefore asked the public not to believe what the 
UDD leaders were saying.
As mentioned earlier, Abhisit tried to present himself as the leader of all Thais. 
Plus, he's a politician. It is not surprising that Abhisit refrained from denouncing all the 
demonstrators, while recognizing that most of them had genuine grievances. In the 
first phase the representation of the demonstrators was the most negative in Abhisit's 
remark on April 9. He used negative terms to condemn the demonstrators regarding the 
incident at THAICOM station and made clear that the only mission the government 
must do was to uphold the rule of law. This remark was the major turning point of the 
situation as it led to the clashes on April 10, and Abhisit's loss of moral high ground. 
After the remarks on April 9, Abhisit never explicitly portrayed the demonstrators in a 
negative way, even when the government needed to step up measures to control the 
situation. Instead, they were portrayed as victims of the terrorists. Therefore, the 




7.3 'Unfortunately, Some People Died.'
Even though Abhisit announced in May that normalcy had been restored, the 
government did not lift the emergency decree until December. Under the emergency 
law, basic rights of expression and peaceful assembly were strictly controlled whereas 
freedom of the media was suppressed. The International Crisis Group (2010:7) 
observed that the government's application of emergency law went beyond the need to 
restore order, thus hardening the Red Shirts' negative view of the government. 
Political division in the country became deeper. To the Red Shirts, the 
crackdown confirmed their view that they were excluded and treated with 'double 
standards' by the Thai state. The government did not respond to their causes but 
brutally defeated them. To others, the arson attacks which followed immediately after 
the crackdown, tended to confirm the government's claim that Thaksin and UDD 
leaders were terrorists. 
The poll, conducted by surveying 1689 people in 17 provinces covering all 
regions in the country, showed that 66.3 percent of respondents did not believe that 
Abhisit's reconciliation would be successful. This was unsurprising. However, only 4.5 
percent wanted Abhisit to resign, and 11.2% demanded the dissolution of parliament 
(Bangkok Post, June 14, 2010). In other words, Abhisit did not have to step down to 
show his responsibility for the loss of life during the military crackdown on the UDD 
campaign. To say this with his TV show's name, most Thai people seemed to still be 
'confident in Thailand with PM Abhisit'. This information brings me back to the 
question that led me to the topic for this study: 'how could the government in a 
democratic society be able to hold on to power after having committed a massacre on 
civilians?' 
After the invocation of the Emergency Decree on April 7, the government was 
able to control the meanings (at least in the mainstream media) of the events and 
representation of actors involved in the UDD campaign. It tightened its control on 
media freedom. The media affiliated with or with close ties to the UDD were censored, 
banned and forcibly closed down, or involved in legal proceedings (Reporters without 
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Borders 2011). Therefore, how the UDD campaign was portrayed or represented 
through lexical and iconological choices in Abhisit's televised remarks and CRES' 
television announcement shaped the public's negative understanding of the UDD 
campaign and the demonstrators.
In contrast to previous democratic mass rallies, the crackdown was not seen by 
a majority of Bangkok's residents whose views dominated the mainstream media as 
'soldiers killing innocent demonstrators', but rather as 'rabble burning bangkok' 
(Nelson 2011:18). In the media coverage of the situation after the crackdown, the high 
number of killings was overshadowed by reports of the arson attacks and their likely 
consequences for the economy (Askew 2010:315). Likewise, the deceased and injured 
UDD demonstrators were not remembered as political martyrs but seen as uneducated 
and naive 'ban-nok' led by terrorists to topple the monarchy. 
On May 23, thousands of Bangkok residents and social groups participated in 
the campaign called 'Bangkok Big Cleaning Day' to clean up Ratchaprasong area. 
Some critics viewed this activity as a means to destroy forensic evidence that could be 
used to convict those who caused loss of life during Operation Ratchaprasong. At the 
same time, television and radio channels kept on playing the song 'May Happiness 
Come Back' (khor-kwam-suk-khuen-klub-ma) featuring voices of 301 entertainers 
(The Nation, May 26, 2010). Even though the song was not initiated by the 
government campaign, it employed kwam-suk (happiness), kwam-sa-ngop (calmness), 
and sa-mak-ki (unity) the values Abhisit had used in his television addresses during the 
UDD campaign. After two-month occupation of central Bangkok, the ban-nok 
invasion was over. The 'ban-nok' were gone but not before they had caused damage to 
the capital city. Bangkok residents joined forces to clean up the stained left by the ban-
nok. Afterwards, Bangkok residents could enjoy their normal lives again.
Even though the voices of those supporting Abhisit and denouncing the UDD 
campaign were louder in the mainstream media, the voice of the Red Shirts got, as 
always, louder when expressed through the ballot box. Elections were eventually held 
in July 2011, and were once again won by the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party. It won 265 
of 500 seats, gaining 32 more seats than in the previous 2007 elections, while 
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Democrat Party got only 159 seats. Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of 
Thaksin, became the first female prime minister of Thailand while Abhisit became the 
leader of the opposition. Both remain in their positions today (April 2013). Yingluck's 
landslide victory showed the public's rejection of the intervention of the military and 
the establishment against the Red Shirt movement (Hewison 2012:29).
On September 17, 2012, the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand 
(TRCT) issued its final 276-page report regarding violence during the UDD campaign 
in 2010. The TRCT's status as an 'independent' body was problematic. It had been set 
up by the Abhisit government on June 8, 2010 and its chairman Kanit na Nakorn had 
been personally picked by Abhisit. One of its members, Somchai Hom-laor, was 
sympathetic to the Yellow Shirt (The Nation, September 14, 2012).
In a press conference to present its report, Somchai concluded that the UDD 
leaders were partly to blame for the violence during the UDD campaign (Bangkok 
Post, September 18, 2010). Particularly during the clashes on April 10, they provoked 
demonstrators with their speeches and made inadequate efforts to prevent the violence. 
At the end of the conference, commission chairman Kanit commented that Thaksin 
should stay out of Thai politics (The Nation, September 18, 2012).
One of the report's highlights was its finding about the role of the 'men in black' 
during the UDD campaign. It stated that they were responsible for the attacks on the 
military during the clashes on April 10 and other incidents leading to the crackdown on 
May 19. The report also linked some of them to the late Major-General Khattiya, and 
the UDD security guards. The report pointed out that the violent incident on April 10 
was crucial in forging hostility between the military and the UDD, and “the operation 
by the men in black was instrumental in creating and escalating violence with the aim 
of provoking the army to use weapons against the demonstrators, and wanting to cause 
loss of life” (TRCT 2012:111).
According to criticisms made by pro-Red Shirt academics and activists, the 
report seemed to indicate that the UDD campaign was not peaceful and the use of 
force was thus necessary (Bangkok Post, September 24, 2012). It misled the public 
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into thinking that the use of military force by the government against the 
demonstrators was in retaliation against the men in black. It thus downplayed violence 
caused by the government and gave the impression that the state was not the main 
perpetrator. Even though the report paid much attention to the men in black, it failed to 
clarify who they were or reveal who they killed. 
To be fair with TRCT, its report also blamed the army and the government for 
loss of life during the incidents. It stated that the government had failed to control the 
military's use of war weapons and live ammunition. It also criticized CRES for lacking 
a system to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the operations by security 
officers.
All in all, it can be said that the report confirmed the narrative made by Abhisit 
and CRES during the UDD campaign in 2010 that the 'terrorists' had infiltrated the 
demonstrators and caused much loss of life both among the demonstrators and the 
soldiers, making it necessary for the government to put an end to the campaign. In 
other words, TRCT defended Abhisit's decision to order the crackdown on the UDD 
campaign. Natthawut Saikua, one of the core leaders of the UDD campaign,  
commented that TRCT did not provide in-depth findings on the violent incidents in 
2010. Instead, it made general observations that fitted information previously supplied 
by a certain political party (The Nation, September 19, 2012).
Two years after he had claimed that there were attempts to provoke him so he 
would become guilty of murder (p.65), he was actually accused of exactly that. On 
December 6, 2012, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) charged Abhisit and 
former Deputy PM Suthep with murder over the death of taxi driver Phan Kamkong 
during Operation Ratchaprasong (The Nation, December 7, 2012). The charges were 
based on a Criminal Court ruling that the taxi driver had been shot dead by a military 
officer. It alleged that Abhisit and Suthep had authorized the army to use lethal 
weapons against the UDD demonstrators. If found guilty, they may face the death 
penalty or a lengthy jail term. 
The murder charges against Abhisit are unprecedented in the political history of 
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Thailand because this is the first time a prime minister has been accused of being 
accountable for extrajudicial killings (The Nation, December 10, 2012). It would be 
possible that Abhisit and Suthep may also face over 700 attempted-murder cases, as 
about 700 people were severely injured from military operations during the UDD 
campaign in 2010 (The Nation, December 19, 2012). However, the charges have been 
met with the argument that they are politically motivated to force the Democrat Party 
to support Puea Thai's proposal to pass a bill giving blanket amnesty to all those 
involved in the political crisis since the 2006 coup. The point is, it is claimed, to put 
Abhisit in the same position as Thaksin, so both will need an amnesty to avoid facing a 
court of law.
In an interview with BBC World News in London on December 10, 2012, 
Abhisit accepted that his government authorized the use of live ammunition in the 
military operation against the UDD demonstrators with clear instructions as to how 
and under what circumstances the military could use it. He said he regretted the loss of 
lives. However, he claimed that the murder charges against him were far-fetched. The 
host asked why he thought so despite the fact that he had ordered the crackdown on the 
demonstrators. He answered using the same narrative as on Thai television two years 
earlier:
“But if you recall we had a situation basically of a group of people
 occupying the middle of the city and also had armed people infused within 
the protest. They were actually firing grenades...firing at people. We didn’t 
even go in to disperse the protest. What we did was to cordon off... set up 
check points. These check points were attacked. And there were fightings 
on the street and unfortunately some people died (BBC 2012).” 
Abhisit tried to protect his image as a law-abiding Thai-style leader and 
continued to attack Thaksin for not respecting the law. He said he would fight the 
charges in court. He would accept the verdict no matter how it turned out, and asked 
Thaksin to do the same. He said 
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    “I will accept whatever verdict, even if it's a death penalty, I will accept that.
 And I'm asking the former prime minister and members of this...the current 
government that they should do the same, because they are always looking to 
pass a bill to grant themselves amnesty. That's not something I've ever done. 
I'm willing to face the charges. I will fight to prove my innocence in the court,
and if the court for whatever reason passed the guilty verdict, I would accept 
it (BBC 2012).”
No matter what Abhisit says, he will be remembered as the first civilian Thai 
Prime Minister ordering a crackdown on civilian demonstrations leading to the death 
of almost a hundred people. The UDD campaign and its sad fate will remain one of the 
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